Can African food systems thrive without chemical fertilisers?

The rise in fertiliser prices caused by the US-Israeli war on Iran has been a stark reminder of how dependent the global food system is on this chemical input. With the Strait of Hormuz effectively blocked, the world suddenly lost one of its most critical sources of fertiliser exports, as well as the sulphur and natural gas needed to produce fertilisers elsewhere. Fertiliser prices increased sharply as a result, raising fears of a food price crisis, which could affect millions of people who are already food insecure (see Graphic 1).^¹

When international fertiliser prices spike, they tend to reach their most extreme levels in Africa.^² During the last surge in 2021, fertiliser companies increased their prices in Africa to levels above those on international markets, and then kept them there until 2023 when prices dropped elsewhere.^³ Things could be worse this time around, given the dependence of African countries on fertilisers from the Persian Gulf (see Box).

Yet food systems in much of Africa have been shielded from the impacts of these price swings and shortages. That is because fertiliser use is much lower here than in other parts of the world. Chemical fertilisers are rarely used on traditional food crops like cassava in West Africa, sorghum in the Sahel, or banana around the Great Lakes. Nor are indigenous chicken and cattle breeds fed on diets of fertiliser-intensive commercial feeds. Fertiliser tends to be used most heavily on cash crops, like cotton or sugar cane. So, rising global fertiliser prices do not necessarily translate into higher food prices in Africa, at least for locally produced foods.

Yet this situation is changing. Over the past two decades, African governments and donors have ploughed billions of dollars into subsidy schemes and development programmes to increase fertiliser use by small farmers. Use has gone up, almost double what it was twenty years ago (see Graphic 2.).^⁴ But only 15 countries account for nearly 90% of Africa's fertiliser consumption. Just four -- Egypt, South Africa, Ethiopia and Nigeria— account for two-thirds (see Map ).^⁵

A steep price

Since 2006, African governments have devoted on average 30% of their national agriculture budgets to the fertiliser subsidies. In Ethiopia, Malawi and Zambia, the figure is closer to 50%. At one point, Malawi's payouts ate up 8% of the entire government budget, forcing cuts to public education and infrastructure.^⁶ Yet these massive expenditures have not worked. Average fertiliser use among small farmers has plateaued at around 20 kg per hectare, far from the 50 kg per hectare that African governments committed to achieving under the Abuja Declaration in 2006.^⁷ Why? Prices.

“Some fertilisers are subsidised by the government at relatively fair prices, but these are provided to farmers in very small quantities, insufficient to meet their needs," says Ahmed Elmaghrabi, a leader with the newly formed Federation of Trade Union Solidarity in Egypt. "So, farmers purchase fertilisers from the market to supplement their needs. The price difference is significant, reaching up to five times the price of subsidised fertiliser. It's a big burden for small farmers.”^⁸

Leocardia Shayamunda of the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace says the situation is similar in Zimbabwe. “Many poor farmers who manage to buy fertilisers do not use the prescribed amount but less, and the result is that they still get poor yields, just enough for household consumption with little or nothing extra to earn some income.”^⁹

The German NGO INKOTA looked into the experience of farmers in Tanzania's Ilhemi Cluster, where the government partnered with fertiliser corporations and donors to heavily encourage farmers to use high levels of subsidised fertilisers on maize. In this case, the number of farmers using fertiliser more than doubled. But input costs for farmers quintupled, from an average of US$30 to US$160 per season. As a result, INKOTA found farmers did not benefit from the higher yields and are now vulnerable to any increase in the price of fertiliser and other inputs.^¹⁰

The scenario is the same for farmers in other parts of Africa where high levels of chemical fertilisers are used on cash crops. In Burkina Faso and Egypt, for example, cotton farmers use a lot of fertilisers. But their production costs can exceed the price they get for the crop, forcing them to produce less.^¹¹ In Kenya, where tea is the most important farm export and receives more fertiliser per hectare than any other crop, small growers are abandoning production because of high fertiliser costs, together with low tea prices.^¹² The same goes with small-scale farmers growing tobacco under contract in Malawi. Fertilisers are their biggest expense, and most of them suffer from chronic debt, with their costs of production always higher than what they receive for their tobacco.^¹³

Fertile ground for fertiliser corporations

Fertilisers are not just expensive in Africa, they are more expensive here. African farmers are generally charged more for the same fertilisers sold to farmers in other parts of the world, including the US and Europe.^¹⁴ Some of this is due to infrastructure challenges and logistics. Corruption is also a contributing factor.^¹⁵ But these prices are also a reflection of the market power of fertiliser companies who control imports and distribution.^¹⁶

Many of Africa's national fertiliser markets are in the hands of a small number of companies and traders with monopoly or near-monopoly positions.^¹⁷ In Malawi and Tanzania, for instance, a few large foreign companies control around 90% of fertiliser retail sales and imports.^¹⁸ This gives these companies power to set prices and extract profits. For fertiliser traders in East and Southern Africa, profit margins are around 40%. In other parts of the continent, they vary from 30% to a whopping 80%!^¹⁹

The African fertiliser market is currently worth around US$10-$15 billion and is projected to grow to US$20 billion over the next four years.^²⁰ The largest fertiliser manufacturers -- like Yara of Norway, OCP of Morocco, PhosAgro of Russia, Nutrien of Canada and Mosaic of the US -- are all trying to expand their presence in this growing and profitable market.^²¹ So, too, are investors from the Gulf and local billionaires like Aliko Dangote (see Table 1.).

Yara's big move to break into Africa was through the Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor of Tanzania (SAGCOT), which it helped plan and initiate in 2011 with the support of Norway, the US and the Gates Foundation. Although SAGCOT failed in its ambition to convert the area into large-scale industrial farms and contract growing operations, it did enable Yara to develop a vertically-integrated network extending deep into the Tanzanian countryside.^²² Yara is now focusing on Tanzania for the roll-out of its AfricaConnect digital platform, which it claims has 130,000 farmer subscribers, many of them actively using the app to get loans to buy fertilisers.^²³

OCP is also using digital tools to expand fertiliser sales in Africa. Its Udongo app has registered 215,000 farmers in seven countries.^²⁴ And it has teamed up with the World Bank to do digital soil mapping for customised fertilisation approaches in West Africa.^²⁵

Another way that Yara and OCP are expanding their market in Africa is through a fertiliser financing mechanism launched by the African Development Bank (AfDB) in 2018. The mechanism provides large corporations, like Yara and OCP, with credit guarantees to boost fertiliser imports and distribution.^²⁶ It is also funding training programmes and facilitating imports through an industry lobby group called the African Fertilizer and Agribusiness Partnership. ^²⁷

But these mechanisms are not really working. The AfDB's programme in Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana, in partnership with OCP, was supposed to generate US$100 million in sales and reach 250,000 farmers. But it has only generated US$4 million in sales for OCP and reached 25,000 farmers. The AfDB said high prices were partly to blame for the failure.^²⁸

We see similar problems in Zimbabwe, where AfDB recently provided a US$4.3 million credit guarantee to a subsidiary of the Saudi fertiliser giant Ma'aden.^²⁹ The bank vowed that the financing would increase production of maize, wheat and oil seeds by enabling Ma'aden to sell 60,000 tonnes of fertiliser to 180,000 farmers. Yet, by the end of 2024, the company had only sold 11,000 tonnes to 88 farmers. While AfDB said that these farmers increased production as a result, it acknowledged that none of them were small-scale farmers!^³⁰

Fertiliser sovereignty?

When African governments and farmers buy fertiliser, most of the money leaves their borders. Only Nigeria and the countries of North Africa are significant producers of chemical fertilisers. The rest have to import about 80% of what they use. In the case of Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Mali and Rwanda, the dependency is complete.^³¹ This is clearly a problem. It leaves countries vulnerable to global market dynamics and drains national income and foreign currency reserves.

Some African states are trying to develop local fertiliser production as a way to drive down prices and overcome this dependence.^³² But this strategy can breed other problems.

In 2019, the government of Burundi enacted a ban on fertiliser imports in order to give the country's sole fertiliser producer a monopoly on sales. This company, owned by the politically connected businessman Adrien Ntigacika, was then accused of billing the government for tens of millions of US dollars for fertilisers that it did not deliver and causing a nationwide fertiliser shortage.^³³Burundi spends a staggering 60% to 70% of its agriculture budget on fertiliser subsidies that go directly to Ntigacika's company. “We see billions going into this sector every year, but fertilisers never reach the people as they should," says Faustin Ndikumana, of the NGO PARCEM Burundi.^³⁴Ntigacika is now developing fertiliser factories through public-private partnerships with governments in Angola, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Uganda, Zambia and Tanzania.^³⁵

Another African billionaire investing heavily in fertiliser production is the Nigerian cement baron Aliko Dangote. He is currently expanding his natural gas-based urea plant in Nigeria, which is already Africa's largest. In August 2025, he also signed a deal with the Ethiopian government to build a similar urea plant there for US$2.5 billion.^³⁶ Singapore’s Indorama Group is also expanding its nitrogen fertiliser production and export facilities in Nigeria, with billions of dollars in financing from development banks.^³⁷

Other countries, like Tanzania, are also planning to use part of their natural gas reserves to produce nitrogen fertilisers. In 2024, Tanzania signed an agreement with Indonesia's ESSA Group for the construction of a US$1.4 billion urea factory. In March 2026, it began talks with Japan's Toyo Engineering Corporation for the construction of another site. At the same time, Tanzania is pursuing plans to build a coal-fired urea factory on 2,700 hectares in Tabora Municipality that villagers say will displace them from lands they use to grow food.^³⁸ The Zambian government, for its part, has commissioned a Chinese company to build and operate a 300,000 tonne urea factory that will be supplied with coal and phosphates from mining operations in the south of the country.^³⁹

Dangote says he can single-handedly end Africa's fertiliser imports with his current projects. "We have a very aggressive trajectory right now. We want to put Dangote to be the highest producer of urea, bigger and higher than Qatar - give me 40 months," he told attendees at the 2024 annual Afreximbank meeting.^⁴⁰

But will Dangote's factories or others in Africa make fertilisers more affordable for African farmers? Dangote's Nigerian factory ships most of its urea to the US and Brazil. And what it sells on the domestic market, or in other African countries, reflects the prices it can get on international markets. It also tends to gravitate toward supplying larger markets outside of Africa when there are supply shocks and price spikes, as it did in 2021.^⁴¹ In early March 2026, just one week after the US and Israel began their assault on Iran, Dangote hiked its urea prices by 40%.^⁴²

There are also heavy environmental and social costs from fertiliser mining and production that need to be considered. Morocco's OCP is investing billions of dollars to expand its phosphate mines and factories. Yet communities living near the company’s operations in Morocco say the pollution and toxic waste is degrading their lands, destroying the surrounding ecosystem and making them sick.^⁴³ Dangote's urea plant in Ethiopia relies on natural gas from the Ogaden Basin, where locals say toxic waste from oil and gas operations are to blame for a deadly sickness that has been affecting their villages since exploration began in 2014.^⁴⁴

Similarly, people living near the phosphate factories of the Groupe Chimique Tunisien in Gabès, Tunisia, suffer from chronic diseases, intoxication and asphyxiation. Local fishers and farmers say that waste from the factory has destroyed their fish stocks and poisoned their lands. The communities created an organisation, Stop Pollution, and in 2025 they held a general strike calling for the factories to be shut down. So far, the government refuses to act.^⁴⁵

Big costs, few benefits

The harms from fertilisers extend well beyond their production sites. Chemical fertilisers are one of the leading contributors to climate change, responsible for more global greenhouse gas emissions than air travel.^⁴⁶ Nitrogen fertilisers account for most of this pollution, and especially those produced with coal. At least two of the new urea factories under construction in Africa -- in Tanzania and Zambia -- are coal-based.

Chemical fertilisers are also driving an environmental crisis in the world's lakes and oceans. Most of the nitrogen and phosphorous used to grow crops leaks into lakes and other water bodies, causing algal blooms and dead zones in the oceans, where marine life cannot survive. While Africa is largely unaffected by this problem because of its low fertiliser use, any intensification will bring problems from run-off.^⁴⁷

More chemical fertilisers also mean more chemical pesticides. When fertilisers are applied in high amounts, plants become vulnerable to pests and diseases. This is why high rates of chemical fertiliser consumption go hand-in-hand with high rates of pesticide use (see Graphic 2). These pesticides can have serious health consequences for farmers and farmworkers, especially women.^⁴⁸

Fertilisers can degrade the fertility of soils over time too, forcing farmers to use more and more fertiliser to maintain productivity.^⁴⁹ “In some areas like the southern highlands regions of Tanzania, where the use of chemical fertilisers started years back, soil fertility has been depleted and, as a result, farmers have to rely on high dosages of chemical fertilisers for them to produce,” says Pius of MVIWATA.^⁵⁰ This has knock-on effects. She and her comrades conducted surveys of the areas heavily targeted by fertiliser promotion programmes. "The results were shocking. We found that farmers using the fertilisers as directed were the majority of those going to bed hungry, without the means to afford a balanced diet of local foods."

Even the Gates-funded AGRA has been forced to admit that the fertiliser subsidy schemes and promotion programmes it supported failed to address hunger. In the 13 countries it targeted to boost the use of fertilisers by small farmers, overall hunger increased by 30% between 2006, when AGRA was launched, to 2020.^⁵¹

Fertilisers are not a magic bullet for food security, as fertiliser companies claim. In many African countries, fertiliser goes to crops that contribute little if anything to food security. In Côte d'Ivoire, 60% of fertilisers are used to grow cotton and cocoa. In Burkina Faso, half goes to cotton (down from a shocking 92% in the early 2000s).^⁵² About 13% of the chemical fertiliser used in Kenya goes to grow tea for export, even though tea covers only 3% of the country's arable land.^⁵³ Sugar cane is another major consumer of fertiliser across the region.^⁵⁴

Even in places where chemical fertilisers is used to grow staple food crops, countries can still be reliant on food imports. Twenty percent of Egypt’s national fertiliser use goes to wheat. But the country still imports half of its annual wheat needs.^⁵⁵

If food production is increased through imported fertilisers made with fossil fuels, can this really be considered "food security"? Today's surging fuel prices make it evident that Africa's path to food sovereignty requires an alternative.

Changing course

The world is stepping into another crisis, with food prices expected to rise significantly because of the US-Israel war on Iran. African countries dependent on food imports will be hit hard once again, and once again governments, donors and corporations will be selling fertilisers as a solution. This approach was applied after the 2007-8 global food crisis, and it failed badly. It is time for a different direction.

African farmers have, over generations, developed highly productive food and farming systems that do not require chemical fertilisers. These systems are based on farmer knowledge, crop diversity and the use of traditional seeds and breeds adapted to local conditions. There are many efforts flourishing across the continent to enhance and expand these alternatives.

“As an African woman farming in arid Baringo, I practice organic farming because healthy soil and water conservation are essential for survival," says Veronica Kibor, a Kenyan farmer member of the Seed Savers Network. "I do not use chemical fertilisers, as they increase costs and weaken soil over time. Through composting, animal manure and mulching, I can improve soil fertility naturally, strengthen drought resilience and protect my family’s food security. Sustainable agriculture empowers women farmers and safeguards the future of our land and communities.”^⁵⁶

Bosco and Veronica Kimani in their ecological farm (Kenya). Source: Greenpeace

The Eastern and Southern Africa Small Scale Farmers' Forum (ESAFF), which brings together 5.5 million small farmers across 16 countries, is also working with its members to develop and promote ecological agriculture and farmer-managed seed systems. “I have never used pesticides because I have a lot of animal manure and home waste. The other alternative is the use of natural fertilisers and herbicides. These are accessible because we use natural materials and produce them ourselves,” says Christine Nabwami, a farmer in Mityana district, Uganda, and member of ESAFF.

In West Africa, farmers’ organisations like Béo-nèere in Burkina Faso, and Mali’s Convergence des Femmes Rurales pour la Souveraineté Alimentaire, which represents 10,000 women farmers, are developing agroecological practices that successfully bypass chemical fertilisers.^⁵⁷ The same is true for Nous Sommes la Solution, a movement which represents 500 rural women organisations and 175,000 members in Burkina Faso, Ghana, Guinea, Mali and Senegal.^⁵⁸

In North Africa, the Tunisian Network for Agroecological Transition is an example of collective action among farmers, together with others, to develop food systems without fertilisers.^⁵⁹ The Tunisian Association of Permaculture, one of its members, has created the “Nourriture Citoyenne” (“Citizen Food”) label for products that are grown without chemical inputs, like fertiliser, and that meet a host of other positive criteria as well.^⁶⁰

Such initiatives point the way forward, but they need far more political, social and economic support. As Pius puts it, “A shift towards practices that ensure sovereignty of our nations, as well as freedom and rights of the producers and consumers is mandatory. Most chemical fertilisers, apart from being unsustainable, are not even produced in our countries.”^⁶¹

A change of course off the chemical fertiliser treadmill and towards agroecology is even more urgent in the face of the climate crisis. Climate scientists are calling today for a 42% global reduction in fertiliser used by 2050, just to keep the planet liveable.^⁶² This will be difficult in places where industrial food and farming systems dominate. Perhaps with the right support, African farmers can show the rest of the world the way out of the fertiliser trap. But we should not be fooled. Climate change is making food production harder, everywhere, especially in Africa. The onus is therefore on all of us to build more sustainable food systems without the crutch of chemical fertilisers and without the tremendous cost of corporate control that goes with them.

Africa's growing fertiliser connection with the Gulf

The US-Israel war on Iran has drawn attention to how dependent some African countries are on fertiliser imports from Gulf countries. Sudan imports over half of its fertilisers from Gulf states, Tanzania 31%, Somalia 30%, Kenya 26% and Mozambique 22%.^⁶³ The Saudi Arabian company Ma'aden is now one of the leading suppliers of phosphate fertiliser to Africa, accounting for 40% of Zambia and Zimbabwe's imports in 2023.^⁶⁴ Even African countries that produce their own fertilisers, such as Morocco and Egypt, depend on Gulf countries for raw materials like sulphur, ammonia and gas.^⁶⁵

Iran is also a key supplier. In 2023, the Iranian firms Pardis Petrochemical Company and Shiraz Petrochemical Company accounted for 14% of Africa's nitrogen fertiliser imports. South Africa took a third of those imports, followed by Mozambique (24%), and Nigeria (17%).^⁶⁶

Connections with the Gulf go beyond trade. In recent years, Emirati and Saudi companies have increased their investments in fertiliser production in Africa. In Egypt, the sovereign wealth funds of Saudi Arabia and Abu Dhabi have together acquired over 40% of two of Egypt's largest nitrogen fertiliser producers, Abu Qir Fertilisers and Misr Fertilizers Production Company. This gives them privileged access to other African markets via the African Continental Free Trade Area.^⁶⁷ The UAE’s Sharkia Group also owns Futurefert, one of the largest fertiliser factories in Egypt.^⁶⁸

Other Gulf players investing in the region are Fertiglobe (UAE) and SABIC (Saudi Arabia). The first has facilities in Egypt, Algeria and South Africa, and claims to be the largest nitrogen producer in the Middle East North Africa region.^⁶⁹ SABIC does not disclose its sales in Africa, but controls 49% of ETC Holdings, a subsidiary of the Mauritius-based Export Trading Group, which is a leading fertiliser trader in several African countries.^⁷⁰

Graph: GRAIN - Sources: International Fertilizer Association – IFA Database (for fertilisers) and FAOSTAT (for pesticides)

Banner photo: Man carrying sack of fertilizer at a distribution center in Banfora Department, Burkina Faso.@Alamy/Jake Lyell

1 Raj Patel, “Op-ed: The Persian Gulf oil crisis is a food crisis”, 17 March 2026, Civil Eats, https://civileats.com/2026/03/17/op-ed-the-persian-gulf-oil-crisis-is-a-food-crisis/; Susannah Savage, Jana Tauschinski, et. al. “The global food crisis unleashed by the war”, 27 March 2026, https://www.ft.com/content/27e07c19-723a-4fce-adab-82538c350e74?syn-25a6b1a6=1

2 Kibrom A. Abay, Jordan Chamberlin, et. al., “Fertilizer, soil health, and economic shocks: A synthesis of recent evidence”, Food Policy, Volume 133, 2025, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.foodpol.2025.102892

3 Simon Roberts, Ntombifuthi Tshabalala, “Food crisis in Africa: the high cost of imported fertilisers is adding to the problem”, 25 July 2023, https://theconversation.com/food-crisis-in-africa-the-high-cost-of-imported-fertilisers-is-adding-to-the-problem-209664

4 International Fertilizer Association – IFA Database, https://www.ifastat.org/databases [Last visit: 25 March 2026]. FAO data, based on information provided by countries differs from IFA’s. See: https://www.fao.org/faostat/; and FAO, “Inorganic fertilizers 2002 – 2023”, FAOSTAT analytical brief, 108, 2025, https://openknowledge.fao.org/server/api/core/bitstreams/4f765978-1bf2-4d48-9e5c-418411701293/content

5 FAO, “Inorganic fertilizers 2002 – 2023”, FAOSTAT analytical brief, 108, 2025, https://openknowledge.fao.org/server/api/core/bitstreams/4f765978-1bf2-4d48-9e5c-418411701293/content

6 INKOTA, “Golden bullet or bad bet? New dependencis on synthetic fertilisers and their impacts on the African continent”, August 2022, https://www.inkota.de/sites/default/files/2023-08/inkota_brochure_fertiliser2022_web.pdf

7 INKOTA, “Golden bullet or bad bet? New dependencies on synthetic fertilisers and their impacts on the African continent”, August 2022, https://www.inkota.de/sites/default/files/2023-08/inkota_brochure_fertiliser2022_web.pdf

8 Conversation with GRAIN in February 2026.

9 Conversation with GRAIN in January and February 2026

10 INKOTA, “Golden bullet or bad bet? New dependencies on synthetic fertilisers and their impacts on the African continent”, August 2022, https://www.inkota.de/sites/default/files/2023-08/inkota_brochure_fertiliser2022_web.pdf

11 Tarek Mohamed Abo-mosa, Nivine Todary Guirguis Bebawy, and Emad Hassanien Ahmed Aly, "Economic Study of Cotton Production and Marketing in Egypt (Case study: Dakahlia Governorate)", Journal of Xi’an Shiyou University, Natural Science Edition, March 2025, https://www.xisdxjxsu.asia/V21I03-16.pdf; Fana Sylla, “Cotton and Products Annual,” USDA, March 2024: https://apps.fas.usda.gov/newgainapi/api/Report/DownloadReportByFileName?fileName=Cotton+and+Products+Annual_Dakar_Senegal_SG2024-0002.pdf

12 Allan Kimitei, "Brewing Trends - Analysis of Kenya's Tea Industry," USDA, August 2025, https://apps.fas.usda.gov/

13 Azusa Harashima, "The Impact of Tobacco Production Liberalization on Smallholders in Malawi," IDE Discussion Papers, October 2008, http://www.ide.go.jp/English/Publish/Download/Dp/170.html

14 See: Kibrom A. Abay, Jordan Chamberlin, et. al., “Fertilizer, soil health, and economic shocks: A synthesis of recent evidence”, Food Policy, Volume 133, 2025, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.foodpol.2025.102892; and Simon Roberts, Ntombifuthi Tshabalala, “Food crisis in Africa: the high cost of imported fertilisers is adding to the problem”, 25 July 2023, https://theconversation.com/food-crisis-in-africa-the-high-cost-of-imported-fertilisers-is-adding-to-the-problem-209664; Manuel Hernandez and Maximo Torero, “Promoting competition in the fertilizer industry in Africa: A global and local approach”, 2018, https://hdl.handle.net/10568/145619; African Market Observatory (AMO) Price Tracker, https://sway.cloud.microsoft/xKgR1JoCQRVLVSiJ?ref=Link [Last visit: 25 March 2026].

15 There are numerous cases of corruption with the fertiliser subsidy schemes. In Malawi, thousands of civil servants fraudulently put their names on lists or used the identities of others to benefit from the subsidies. Some government officers and traders were using the schemes to demand sexual favours from women in exchange for subsidised fertiliser. In Kenya, high-level government officials were involved in distributing fake fertilisers to unsuspecting farmers under its subsidy programme. While in Ethiopia, 11 high-level officials were charged with corruption relating to fertiliser procurement, costing the country US$40 million. See: ACBIO, “Farm input subsidy programmes (FISPs): a benefit for, or the betrayal of, SADCs small-scale farmers?”, July 2016, https://acbio.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/Input-Subsidies-Report-ACBio.pdf; Fazilla Tembo, “Malawi: 3800 civil servants under probe in explosive FISP corruption scandal”, 4 December 2025, https://allafrica.com/stories/202512040376.html; Polygraph, “Kenyan first lady tries hushing fake fertilizer scandal by claiming prayers are best fertilizers”, 26 April 2024, https://www.voanews.com/a/fact-check-kenyan-first-lady-tries-hushing-fake-fertilizer-scandal-by-claiming-prayers-are-best-fertilizers-/7586603.html; Moyale News, “Breaking: 11 officials charged in major fertilizer corruption case”, 27 November 2025, https://www.facebook.com/darweshma/posts/breaking-11-officials-charged-in-major-fertilizer-corruption-case-the-ethiopian-/1322543026554327/

16 Jacob Ricker-Gilbert, Mindy Mallory, et. al., “Causes and consequences of the 2021/22 Fertilizer Price Spike on sub-Saharan Africa. Lessons learned and implications for future actions”, AGRA, Sustain Africa, UK Aid, USAID, 4 September 2024, https://sustainafrica-initiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/Causes-and-consequences-of-the-fertilizer-price-spike-in-SSA.pdf

17 Simon Roberts, et al., “Concentration, competition and market outcomes in fertiliser markets in East and Southern Africa”, 2024, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/378477043_Concentration_competition_and_market_outcomes_in_fertiliser_markets_in_East_and_Southern_Africa

18 Jacob Ricker-Gilbert, Mindy Mallory, et. al., “Causes and consequences of the 2021/22 Fertilizer Price Spike on sub-Saharan Africa. Lessons learned and implications for future actions”, AGRA, Sustain Africa, UK Aid, USAID, 4 September 2024, https://sustainafrica-initiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/Causes-and-consequences-of-the-fertilizer-price-spike-in-SSA.pdf

19 Simon Roberts, et al., “Concentration, competition and market outcomes in fertiliser markets in East and Southern Africa”, 2024, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/378477043_Concentration_competition_and_market_outcomes_in_fertiliser_markets_in_East_and_Southern_Africa

20 See: AfDB, “Africa fertilizer financing mechanism, Annual report 2024”, 2025, https://www.afdb.org/en/documents/annual-report-2024-africa-fertilizer-financing-mechanism ; and https://www.mordorintelligence.com/industry-reports/africa-fertilizers-market

21 INKOTA, “Golden bullet or bad bet? New dependencies on synthetic fertilisers and their impacts on the African continent”, August 2022, https://www.inkota.de/sites/default/files/2023-08/inkota_brochure_fertiliser2022_web.pdf

22 Gideon Tups, "Economic Geographies of Future-Making along a Development Corridor: Effects of the Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor of Tanzania (SAGCOT) on agro-industrial Global Value Chains" University of Köln, 2023: https://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/64720/1/Dissertation_publish-Gideon_Tups.pdf; GRAIN and La Via Campesina Southern and Eastern Africa, "A new wave of land grabs strikes Tanzania", February 2024, https://grain.org/e/7070; and INKOTA, “Golden bullet or bad bet? New dependencies on synthetic fertilisers and their impacts on the African continent”, August 2022, https://www.inkota.de/sites/default/files/2023-08/inkota_brochure_fertiliser2022_web.pdf

23 Yara Annual report 2023, https://www.yara.com/siteassets/investors/057-reports-and-presentations/annual-reports/2023/yara-integrated-report-2023.pdf

24 See: Oxford Business Group, “Agriculture in Africa 2023”, December 2023, https://allafrica.com/download/resource/main/main/idatcs/00131336:2c06dafd114b35d34fb7825a1d2f2c6f.pdf; and Jasper Hamann, “OCP Africa’s Udongo platform spurs digital revolution in agriculture”, 15 March 2024, https://www.moroccoworldnews.com/2024/03/22042/ocp-africas-udongo-platform-spurs-digital-revolution-in-agriculture/

25 World Bank, “OCP Group and World Bank join forces to boost food security and agricultural development in West Africa”, 11 October 2023, https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2023/10/11/ocp-group-and-world-bank-join-forces-to-boost-food-security-and-agricultural-development-in-west-africa

26 AfDB, “Africa fertilizer financing mechanism. Annual report for 2020”, April 2021, https://www.afdb.org/sites/default/files/documents/projects-and-operations/africa_fertilizer_financing_mechanism_affm_-annual_report_for_2020.pdf

27 See: AfDB, “Africa fertilizer financing mechanism. Annual report for 2020”, April 2021, https://www.afdb.org/sites/default/files/documents/projects-and-operations; AfDB, “The Africa Fertilizer Financing Mechanism governing council calls for more private sector financing in the fertilizer sector”, 30 March 2022, https://www.afdb.org/en/news-and-events/africa-fertilizer-financing-mechanism-governing-council-calls-more-private-sector-financing-fertilizer-sector-50695; https://web.archive.org/web/20240720193830/https://afap-partnership.org/about-us/partners/; https://web.archive.org/web/20251009140803/https://afap-partnership.org/news/afap-uganda-strengthens-fertilizer-financing-and-demand-creation-efforts/; and https://web.archive.org/web/20250207044336/https://afap-partnership.org/news/transforming-agricultural-productivity-the-afap-inputs-supply-model-in-mozambique/

28 See: https://www.afdb.org/sites/default/files/documents/projects-and-operations/africa_fertilizer_financing_mechanism_affm_-annual_report_for_2020.pdf; and AfDB, “Africa fertilizer financing mechanism, Annual report 2024”, 2025, https://www.afdb.org/en/documents/annual-report-2024-africa-fertilizer-financing-mechanism

29 See: https://www.afdb.org/en/initiatives-partnerships/africa-fertilizer-financing-mechanism/our-projects/african-emergency-food-production-facility-project-zimbabwe

30 See: AfDB, “Africa fertilizer financing mechanism, Annual report 2024”, 2025, https://www.afdb.org/en/documents/annual-report-2024-africa-fertilizer-financing-mechanism; https://youtu.be/KRVJdXBM_c0?si=7lEULzL87kI2xEF1

31 See: Charlotte Hebebrand and Joseph Glauber, “The Russia-Ukraine war after a year: Impacts on fertilizer production, prices, and trade flows”, 9 March 2023, https://www.ifpri.org/blog/russia-ukraine-war-after-year-impacts-fertilizer-production-prices-and-trade-flows/; and Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung and TMG – Think Tank for Sustainability, “Soil Atlas 2024. Facts and figures about a vital resource”, November 2024, https://eu.boell.org/en/SoilAtlas-PDF

32 See: ACBIO, “The political economy of Africa’s burgeoning chemical fertiliser rush”, 2014, https://acbio.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/Fertilizer-report-20140915.pdf

33 See: "FOMI au cœur de l’alerte : le ministre des finances Dr Alain Ndikumana pourrait-il être assassiné comme le Ministre Emmanuel Niyonkuru ?", Focode Magazine, December 2025, https://focode.org/focodemag/focodemag291225; and INFO SOS Médias Burundi, “Bururi: farmers in distress facing a shortage of fertilizers in the middle of the farming season B”, 7 March 2025, https://www.sosmediasburundi.org/en/2025/03/07/bururi-farmers-in-distress-facing-a-shortage-of-fertilizers-in-the-middle-of-the-farming-season-b/

34 "Burundi Finance Minister Alleges FOMI Breached Contract, Reports Receiving Threats," Breaking Burundi, December 2025, https://breakingburundi.com/burundi-finance-minister-alleges-fomi-breached-contract-reports-receiving-threats/

35 "Un entrepreneur au cœur de la diplomatie économique," Burundi Forum, November 2025, https://burundi-forum.org/110057/un-entrepreneur-au-coeur-de-la-diplomatie-economique/

36 IFA, “From importer to fertilizer powerhouse: Ethiopia’s $2.5 billion Dangote gamble”, 31 August 2025, https://www.ifa.gov.et/2025/08/31/from-importer-to-fertilizer-powerhouse-ethiopias-2-5-billion-dangote-gamble/

37 IFC, "IFC and Partners Back Indorama in Nigeria with $1.25 Billion for Fertilizer Production, Food Sector," March 2024, https://www.ifc.org/en/pressroom/2024/ifc-and-partners-back-indorama-in-nigeria-with-125-billion-for-fertilizer-production-food-sector

38 See the interviews with villagers by Cg Online TV, January 2026, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nOvi2LS98ws and https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Xh_OnbbyjCs

39 United Capital Fertilizer, "New $300m fertilizer plant to cut prices by 40%", https://unitedcapitalfertilizer.com/new-300m-fertilizer-plant-to-cut-prices-by-40/; Xinhua, "Zambia commissions China-built fertilizer plant," November 2025, https://english.news.cn/20251017/d856e6c873c042429e7b3ce6544472cd/c.html

40 Isaac Anyaogu, "Nigeria's Dangote aims to end Africa's fertiliser imports," Reuters, June 2025, https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/nigerias-dangote-aims-end-africas-fertiliser-imports-2025-06-27/

41 Jacob Ricker-Gilbert, Mindy Mallory, et. al., “Causes and consequences of the 2021/22 Fertilizer Price Spike on sub-Saharan Africa. Lessons learned and implications for future actions”, AGRA, Sustain Africa, UK Aid, USAID, 4 September 2024, https://sustainafrica-initiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/Causes-and-consequences-of-the-fertilizer-price-spike-in-SSA.pdf

42 "Urea Prices Surge 40%, Nigeria Concludes at $655/t FOB, Price Trend and Analysis," Afriqom, 6 March 2026, https://www.afriqom.com/insights/nigeria-urea-prices-jump-40%25-amid-iran-conflict%2C-global-fertiliser-markets-react

43 Manon Stravens, "Pollution, poverty, protests: On the toxic trail of Morocco’s phosphate giant," Follow the Money, July 2025, https://www.ftm.eu/articles/following-toxic-trail-morocco-phosphate-giant

44 Juweria Ali and Tom Gardner, "The mystery sickness bringing death and dismay to eastern Ethiopia," Guardian, February 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2020/feb/20/the-mystery-sickness-bringing-death-and-dismay-to-eastern-ethiopia

45 The Tunisian government also plans to build a green ammonia plant in the region for export to Europe. The people of Gabès reject this in view of the large amount of water and energy needed. See: Nadia Addezio, “Gabès is suffocating: breathing under phosphate, protest, and green colonialism”, 4 February 2026, https://untoldmag.org/gabes-tunisia-polution-protest/; https://www.facebook.com/StopPollution2; See also: https://youtu.be/xUzxKCBOyNU?si=bmBXa07L3skT4Zh4

46 GRAIN, “New research shows 50 year binge on chemical fertilisers must end to address the climate crisis”, 1 November 2021, https://grain.org/e/6761

47 Tully, K. L., Hickman, J. E., Russo, T. A., Neill, C., Matata, P., Nyadzi, G., et al., "The fate of nitrogen during agricultural intensification in East Africa: Nitrogen budgets in contrasting agroecosystems," Journal of Geophysical Research: Biogeosciences, 128, 2023: https://doi.org/10.1029/2022JG007128

48 See for example: Suleyman Demi and Suzanne Sicchia, “Agrochemicals Use Practices and Health Challenges of Smallholder Farmers in Ghana”, Environmental Health Insights, 17 September 2021, https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC8450680/; and Elina Andersson and Ellinor Isgren, “Gambling in the garden: Pesticide use and risk exposure in Ugandan smallholder farming”, Journal of Rural Studies, Volume 82, February 2021, https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0743016721000139

49 INKOTA, “Golden bullet or bad bet? New dependencies on synthetic fertilisers and their impacts on the African continent”, August 2022, https://www.inkota.de/sites/default/files/2023-08/inkota_brochure_fertiliser2022_web.pdf; Tully, K. L., Hickman, J. E., Russo, T. A., Neill, C., Matata, P., Nyadzi, G., et al., "The fate of nitrogen during agricultural intensification in East Africa: Nitrogen budgets in contrasting agroecosystems," Journal of Geophysical Research: Biogeosciences, 128, 2023: https://doi.org/10.1029/2022JG007128

50 Conversation with GRAIN in February 2026.

51 Tim Wise, “Failing Africa’s farmers: an impact assessment of the Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa”, Global Development and Environment Institute, Working paper 20-01, July 2020, https://bpb-us-e1.wpmucdn.com/sites.tufts.edu/dist/0/5123/files/2020/07/20-01_Wise_FailureToYield.pdf

52 World Bank, “Burkina Faso. Agro-silvo-pastoral sector public expenditure review”, 2023, https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/099621304162432367/pdf/IDU12f1912631af9914c85192fe1af9d9e8bcaf7.pdf

53 Data are from KilimoSTAT: https://statistics.kilimo.go.ke/

54 Source: International Fertilizer Association – IFA Database. Data for 2018 (https://www.ifastat.org/consumption/fertilizer-use-by-crop) [Last visit: 9 December 2025]

55 AfDB, AFFM, OCP Africa, “Africa fertilizer market and finance analysis”, June 2025, https://www.afdb.org/en/documents/africa-fertilizer-market-and-finance-analysis

56 Conversation with GRAIN in February 2026.

57 See: https://beoneere-agroecologie.bf/; and https://cofersa.org/actions/

58 See: https://wasafrica.org

59 See: https://sites.google.com/agroecologie-tunisie.network/new/accueil

60 See: https://permaculturetunisie.org/reseau-nourriture-citoyenne/

61 Conversation with GRAIN in February 2026.

62 Foodrise, “Exhausted earth. How fertiliser corporations destroyed the nitrogen cycle and how to fix it”, 2025, https://foodrise.org.uk/research/exhausted-earth/

63 UNCTAD, “Strait of Hormuz disruptions. Implications for global trade and development”, 10 March 2026, https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/osgttinf2026d1_en.pdf

64 Simon Roberts, et al., “Concentration, competition and market outcomes in fertiliser markets in East and Southern Africa”, 2024, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/378477043_Concentration_competition_and_market_outcomes_in_fertiliser_markets_in_East_and_Southern_Africa

65 Swati Kushwaha, “Global fertiliser dependency on Gulf exports: what if Hormuz is disrupted?”, 18 June 2025, https://www.kpler.com/blog/global-fertiliser-dependency-on-gulf-exports-what-if-hormuz-is-disrupted

66 Sources: FAOSTAT [Last visit: 14 December 2025]; and Ana News Agency, “Iran-Made petrochemical products well sold in European, African, Latin American markets”, 2 January 2024, https://ana.ir/en/news/4677/iran-made-petrochemical-products-well-sold-in-european-african-latin-american-markets

67 See: Abu Qir Fertilisers, “Financial statements of the financial year ended June 30, 2025”, 2025, https://abuqir.net/investors/finantial; MOPCO, “Annual report 2024”, 2025, https://www.mopco-eg.com/en/investor-relation/financial-reports; and WAYA Staff, “Saudi’s Sovereign Wealth Fund to acquire 25% of Mopco”, 10 August 2022, https://waya.media/saudis-sovereign-wealth-fund-to-acquire-25-of-mopco/

68 See: https://sharkiagroup.com/futurefert-fertilizers-chemicals-industry/

69 See: https://fertiglobe.com/about-us/our-business/

70 SABIC, “Annual report 2024”, 2025, https://www.sabic.com/en/investors/performance-financial-highlights/annual-report

Can African food systems thrive without chemical fertilisers?

Related articles

A corporate cartel fertilises food inflation

The real seeds producers: Small-scale farmers save, use, share and enhance the seed diversity of the crops that feed Africa