NATIONALISM AND GLOBALISM:  
SOCIAL MOVEMENT RESPONSES  

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Just as classical imperialism created anti-colonial responses, so the globalizing wave of corporate and state restructuring is generating popular responses. Earlier waves of globalization were driven by missionary zeal and empire building, and found their response in a wave of anti-colonial nationalisms. Today’s globalization is driven by private corporations and is associated with a dramatic internationalization of the state (Held et al 1999). In response, social movements are working together, organizing the constituencies emerging from corporate globalization. In the process they are reconstituting political community. What are the key features of these new communities? How far do they create new forms out of old, and in particular, what is the fate of nationalism?

As state legitimacy falters and is not re-constructed at the international level, social movements have constitutes what some have called a global civil society (Falk 1995; Lipschutz 1992). Such movements claim status as a “global transformative audience”, what many observers have characterized as “globalization from below” (Sousa-Santos 1995; Brecher et al 2000). These movements face many problems, but perhaps most important is the question of popular sovereignty and nationalism.

Despite losing significant elements of legitimacy, national states remain important “arenas for democratic struggles” and the category of nation remains a “helpful mediation between the local and the global” (Calhoun 1993). Yet - and here is the central dilemma - state sovereignty, and the official nationalism that accompanies it, is often seen as the most profound ideological barrier to cosmopolitanism.
The World Order Models Project, for instance, an advocate of "globalization from below", recognizes nationalism as "the decisive basis of political community", yet acknowledges it to be the central "normative hinge that separates the still prevailing geopolitics from the new circumstances of geo-governance" (Falk 1995).

If indeed nationalism is decisive, then to have the necessary mobilizing power, "globalization from below" must be able to harness, reorient, or refocus nationalism. Here it is argued the new forms of mobilization are melding of globalist aspirations with national goals, in paradoxical combinations of cosmopolitan and nationalist commitment, a form of "cosmopolitics" that engages with nationalism (Cheah and Robbins 1998).

The argument is presented in three parts. First there is discussion of Nairn’s approach to nationalism, relating it to globalism debates. Second, there is analysis of social movement strategies under corporate globalism, highlighting how they directly or indirectly implicate nationalism. Third, there is discussion of the new forms of identification, across nationalism and globalism, suggesting they may be generating paradoxically cosmopolitan modes of nationalism.

1. Nationalism: the Modern Janus

Debates about nationalism and internationalism are often posed in simplistic either-or terms. Detractors of nationalism accuse nationalists of reliance on exclusivist or identarian politics, advocates of nationalism accuse internationalists of idealism and implicit imperialism (Keane 1994; Cardus and Estruch 1995). Invariably, nationalism and nationalist movements are defined against other more universalist ideologies and social movements, in an assumed dichotomy between particularism and universalism. What is defined as particular and universal depends very much on power relations, with cosmopolitans, especially in core states, blind to their own particularism (Furedi 1994).

Theories of nationalism and international politics are rarely linked together, and invariably reproduce given conceptual divisions between domestic and foreign. Theory of nationalism develops as a sub-field of the sociology of national societies, externalizing international politics as extraneous; theory of international politics focuses on cross-national interactions, defining the national context as a given, internal matter.
These conceptual divisions have always been distortions that take for granted nationalist assumptions of nation-state unity and state claims to sovereignty. In practice though, nationalism is a profoundly international ideology, founded upon and driven by inter-national as much as national factors. Similarly, international politics inescapably hinges on national as much as international developments, not simply in a hierarchy from domestic to foreign, but also in many more complex forms of trans-national relations, across national peoples rather than simply between national states.

This mutually constitutive relationship between nationalism and international politics suggests that transformations in one should lead to transformations in the other. Theoretical foundations for these linkages, and associated institutional or ideological mechanisms, are urgently needed as peoples and movements are forced to contest and engage within deepening transnational contexts. As the necessity for transnational strategies intensifies, so does the need for transnational theory. Perspectives are required that that integrate the national and international frameworks into the same theoretical movement, with nationalism theorized as a political ideology embedded within and integral to global politics, and vice versa.

Uneven development and nationalism

Nairn’s uneven development approach seeks to offer such theory. In 1977 Tom Nairn defined nationalism as a “Modern Janus” - one face looking to the future, a vehicle for social transformation, the other looking to the past, reproducing social subordination. He saw nationalism as “both healthy and morbid”, reflecting its origins as a necessary outcome of global capitalism - not chosen as the vehicle for political change, but imposed by the logic of capitalist development (Nairn 1977).

For Nairn, the persistence of nationalism directly results from the globalizing spread and deepening reach of capitalism. For him, nationalism was imposed by uneven development: nationalist self-determination is a “grim necessity of modern social development” (Nairn 1977). Hence, nationalism’s “real origins are...located not in the folk, not in the individual’s repressed passion for some sort of wholeness or identity, but in the machinery of world political economy” (Nairn 1977).

Nairn argues that without a national state apparatus to gain some autonomy in the global economy, industrial development means domination. The only way for people to “contest the concrete form in which...‘progress’ had taken them by the throat” is to construct their own national state (Nairn 1977). The prediction of liberal thinkers on
international politics that global commerce would lead to global social harmony could not have been more mistaken. On the contrary, the over-riding power of global capital is seen as continually reproducing nationalism and generating rather than abating inter-national conflicts.

Here, Nairn’s position parallels that of Benedict Anderson, who stresses the cultural and political dimensions of uneven development in reproducing new forms of nationalism (Anderson 1991). Like Nairn, Anderson argues nationalism is a profoundly modern imagining, not about to be dissolved in the global context (Anderson 1993).

**Internationality and internationalism**

In 1997 Nairn returned to his Janus, updating and extending the analysis. The key position was restated, that nationalism, “far from being an irrational obstacle to development, was for most societies the only feasible way into the development race - the only way they could compete without being either colonized or annihilated” (Nairn 1997). Numerous illustrations of this dialectic were provided, along with a powerful critique of what was characterized as crude internationalism. This critique was important as it emphasized that cosmopolitan internationalism was - and is - a creed of the centre: “There is the same crypto-imperialist streak in the proletarian internationalist ideology as there was in the liberal and free trade dogmas that lent themselves so well to Anglo-Saxon Europe” (Nairn 1997). The same could be said, and has been said, of some contemporary versions of environmental cosmopolitanism, of feminist cosmopolitanism, and of human rights cosmopolitanism.

But Nairn doesn’t close the door on internationalism. While condemning forms of internationalism founded on the denial of nationalism, he raises the possibility of an internationalism that is, instead, defined through its interactions with nationalism. This alternative internationalism can be seen as expressing the wider dialectical relationships between international integration – what he calls internationality - and nationalist fragmentation in the globalized capitalist system. As Nairn argues, “internationalism and nationalism are, in a curious way, perfectly twin ideologies. They are parts of a single overall modern thought world” (Nairn 1997).

This position contrasts with other, more class-centered interpretations (Amin 1980; Hobsbawm 1990; Blaut 1987). For some Marxists, expectations or hopes for an internationalist end to nationalism are counter-posed with reluctant recognition of its continued vitality. Hobsbawm, for instance, explains identity politics and ethno-nationalism in terms of a “hunger for a secure identity and social order in a
disintegrating world”, lamenting the decline of socialist internationalism (Hobsbawm 1994). Integration and reaction are simply paired-up to offer an explanation - more often a description - of current developments, with more than a hint that this is an illogical product of psychological failings or false consciousness. Nairn’s approach contrasts in binding the logic of nationalism into the logic of global politics - including globalization - explaining, not dismissing, nationalist assertion.

The approach also offers a useful corrective to ethno-nationalist and modernization approaches to nationalism (Smith 1980; Gellner 1987). Contrary to ethno-national interpretations (Smith 1992), nationalism cannot be reduced to an ethnic core separable from the state and from the broader global context, and globalization does not simply stimulate ethno-nationalist reaction. Similarly, against modernization approaches (Gellner 1992), the nationalisms that emerged out of industrialization are not in any sense completed, on the contrary, they are constantly undermined, and global diffusion of industry does not necessarily lead to a diminution of national conflict.

Neither an ethno-nationalist revolt against globalization nor a modernist embracing of it is the likely outcome. Indeed, counter-posing globalization against nationalism misses the message that capitalist globalization neither simply integrates not fragments, but creates fragmentation with integration, reflecting its driving dynamic of conflict in unity.

New modes of nationalism?

Ironically, then, transnational integration sharpens conflicts defined in national terms, but simultaneously weakens the role of national states in resolving such conflicts. This, as Amin suggests, can undermine the hegemony of national class alliances and open-up new transnational fields of ideological conflict (Amin 1996). Here, there is no simple retreat into localism as suggested by Smith (and - by default - Hobsbawm). Likewise, there is no leap into the international, as argued by Gellner. On the contrary, the local melds with the global, as suggested by Nairn and Anderson, and nationalism is redefined, and reproduced.

As Nairn argues, corporate globalization will engender new nationalisms, arguing that “the cure for the ills of nationalism is no longer the chimera of internationalism...it can only be a different sort of nationalism” (Nairn 1995). But what is this different nationalism? Some answers to this question lie in the shifting frameworks for identification and political solidarity carried by emerging counter-globalist social movements. Here it is argued the political praxis of these movements is increasingly geared
to both nationalism and globalism, generating new modes of what is later, in part 3, characterized as cosmopolitan nationalism.

2. Social movements, contesting globalism

Transnational integration recontextualizes national and interstate relations: affiliations and identities emerge which bridge divides between national and international contexts. While there can be no simple retreat into the national, there can also be no leap into internationalist or globalist identities. Instead, there is a merging of national and international categories, expressing capitalism’s dynamic of conflict in unity, of inter-state fragmentation paired with corporate homogenization. In this context, challengers to the ideologies of neo-liberal globalization must mobilize across state borders; agendas set in transnational and international contexts cannot be successfully contested by movements confined to local or national frameworks (Arrighi et al 1989). At the same time they must embed their actions in nationality and locality, not simply because it is here that people are able to take action, but more fundamentally because it is also here that coercive (state) power is vested.

As Sousa-Santos argues, “the idioms of regulation and emancipation are inextricably linked together” (Sousa-Santos 1995); waves of corporate and state restructuring have generated anti-systemic responses in the past, for instance in the form of anti-colonialism. Heightened transnational integration may similarly generate new waves of anti-systemic movements, and similarly re-cast nationalism, but to be effective these need to be orientated to international or globalist goals as much as national goals, in what may seem a paradoxical combinations of cosmopolitan and nationalist commitment.

Neo-liberal globalization short-circuits liberal democracy and is profoundly disempowering. It is often argued this requires a fundamental re-think of polity, including definitions of political community and identity. Held argues for a new form of “cosmopolitan democracy”, secured for instance through democratized transnational agencies and cross-country referenda (Held 1995). Such cosmopolitanism hinges on the transformation in the legal regimes that underpin citizenship rights. In this vein, Linklater argues for a “cosmopolitan citizenship...to counterbalance the increased opportunities for elite dominance which accompany the decline of the modern territorial state” (Linklater 1998).

The question of how such responses to globalism will come about, what identifications and vehicles will realize its transformative potential,
directly implicate issues of nationalism and national identity. Clearly the required changes in political cultures will only emerge out of transnational mobilization and here hopes are often vested in the transnational working of an array of old and new social movements. As the WOMP argues, “what gives promise to the vision of cosmopolitan democracy is... most of all, the deeply democratic convictions of transnational initiatives that have begun to construct the alternative paradigm of a global civil society” (Falk 1995). But what is the place of the national and of nationalism in this new order?

The worldwide diffusion of both capitalist relations and the state form lays the groundwork for a common worldwide response to their twin development and legitimacy crises. Legitimacy falters and is not re-constructed at the transnational level, new political spaces are opened-up, and common solidarities flourish. Popular movements may no longer be forced into their respective national containers, and retain their transnational radicalism (Tarrow 1994). Movements exploiting the legitimacy deficits can wedge open transnational ideological spaces, proactively challenging transnational corporations and the legitimacy of supra-state bodies. In doing so, they have the potential to reconfigure national political identities and to reorient state institutions. While formally committed to cosmopolitan objectives, they frame their demands within the national context, constituting communities of conscience beyond yet also within the territorial state. In this they point the way to a reconstituted democracy that flows through and beyond the state - to match the transnational constituencies emerging from increased globalization (Goodman 2002a, 2002b). There are at least three channels for contestation.

**Anti-corporate movements**

First, movements target transnational corporations. With the shift out of national economies, corporate power greatly exceeds corporate legitimacy, opening up a gap to be exploited by popular movements. The myth that business interests are national interests becomes increasingly unconvincing: production and finance shed national legitimacy, and are revealed as powerful political agents. Workers, environmentalists, indigenous peoples, and human rights advocates work together to demand that corporations conform to popular priorities. Their campaigns sharpen the gulf between company rhetoric and corporate reality, politicising corporate practices that previously could be normalized, and de-politicized, as part of the national economy.

Social movements that target transnational corporations are constantly engaged in contesting dominant definitions of the national interest.
under globalism, and in presenting alternatives founded on the assertion popular national sovereignty. Movements directly address questions of regulation at the international level, for instance through the OECD Code of Conduct for Multinational Corporations, or through the United Nations Global Compact. The international labour movement, for instance, has been directly involved for some years with in a social clause campaign directed at the World Trade Organisation; and there are similar efforts at the regional level, through the North American Free Trade Agreement and the European Union.

At the same time though, there is a focus on national systems of regulation, with attempts in the Australian context, for instance, to establish a Corporate Code of Conduct for the subsidiaries of Australia-based corporations. This led to a Federal Senate Inquiry in 2001, which focused around the question of whether the Australian Government had the right to indirectly intervene in the affairs of other countries through binding legislation.

There are similar national-level implications, through the logic of individual campaigns. A good example here is the Rio Tinto campaign - billed as the first transnational labour movement campaign - which was launched by the international federation of miners unions in 1998 after the corporation sought to de-recognize trade unions in Australia. The campaign was fought at the transnational level, with involvement from environmental, indigenous and human rights organizations as well as other trade unions affected by Rio Tinto operations, and was highly effective in forcing the company back to the negotiating table (Evans, Goodman and Lansbury 2002). Again, national priorities and agendas interact with the transnational campaigning, suggesting a flow across these categories.

**Movements for democratisation**

Second, movements challenge inter-governmental regimes. Where regimes are constructed to promote deregulation of national economies, according to the script of neo-liberal globalization, they undermine state legitimacy. They are distanced from formal democracy, yet play an increasing role in shaping domestic policy. The logic of international inter-governmentalism, previously defined as foreign or external relations, or as economic or technical matters not requiring popular participation, becomes visible, and vulnerable to political pressure. Increasingly it is the imperative of global competitiveness that is seen to drive state policy.

Movements emerge to challenge this neo-liberal inter-governmentalism, working together to mirror the scope of inter-state agreements. They
offer powerful arguments for the re-democratization of transnational relations, whether through national or international mechanisms, and some of these demands are offered limited recognition as states seek to re-ground their legitimacy at the international level, for instance, through some re-regulation of the environment, human rights or women’s rights.

Social movements challenging inter-governmentalism also directly engage with national frameworks for representation, characterizing such institutions as distanced from national democracy, and as acting counter to popular priorities. Again, campaigns target the international institutions, and involve international campaigning through transnational social movements, but these campaigns directly feed into - and rest on - national frameworks.

The most successful campaigns against inter-state organizations have been rooted in national contexts: this is an important lesson drawn from the international campaign against the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (an agreement proposed by the OECD). Here campaigners were able to defeat a proposal by successfully bringing national-level campaigns in defense of popular (national) democracy into alliance with an international campaign led by international NGOs (Laxer and Johnston 2002; Goodman and Ranald 2000).

This national-global ideological field has been subsequently been deepened, with campaign organizations acting as conduits for national-level mobilizations against neo-liberal intergovernmental institutions. The Australian Fair Trade and Investment Network is one such organization, that coordinates campaigns and agendas with numerous other national-level NGOs across the globe to target neo-liberal intergovernmentalism, but at the same time focuses on the Australian national contexts, and draws support from a wide range of national NGOs.

Movements for global norms

Third, transnational integration disrupts national identity and forces political consciousness out of the national container. National identities and nationalisms are increasingly constituted by a range of transnational contexts - not least by the rhetoric of globalization. In response, political loyalties and aspirations are forged across borders, rather than largely within them. These are drawn-on to strengthen commitment and confidence, as well as to offer an alternative to the three counter-posed levels of affiliation - local, national and global. They also offer an explicit mirror image of transnational corporate identities, carried by an increasingly visible transnational capitalist class.
Very often these identities center on communities of conscience, drawing on traditions of celebration and commemoration, and engaging in highly personalized forms of collective action. The alternative identities are very often marginalized by mainstream national political culture, but can gain heightened significance, especially where they directly contest the nation with an alternative national script. Here, campaigns for global norms directly reproduce nationalist sentiment, albeit in more inclusive, globally orientated forms.

The process of articulating global norms actively works across the national/global divide. Campaigns often strike a balance between mobilization around cosmopolitan norms while at the same time framing these norms in national contexts. An example is the pursuit of indigenous sovereignty, in Australia for instance, where the assertion of global norms of self-determination proceeds in tandem with the assertion of indigenous identity at the heart of Australian national identity, producing a reconciliation agenda that is as much about uniting the nation as it is about delivering Aboriginal sovereignty (Goodman 2000a).

Similar themes ran through the international campaign for self-determination in East Timor, where the countries that mobilized most actively in support of the East Timorese were those that has some sense of national responsibility for the invasion and subsequent occupation of the country: this included Portugal, of course, as the former colonialist, but also Japan as a former invader, and Australia, or rather the Australian people, that had a direct wartime relationship and later a direct culpability in the invasion and its continuation (Goodman 2000b).

Likewise, for contemporary campaigns around the rights of asylum seekers and refugees, where in Australia campaigners are contesting the nation as much as engaging with universal norms. Campaigns and movements for global humanitarian norms directly seek to construct more inclusive versions of the nation and the national interest and in the process directly assert, mobilize around, and reproduce nationalist sentiment (Goodman forthcoming).

National implications

These emergent forms of transnationalized modes of politics are fought within and across national contexts. They thus have deep implications for national identity. As a political ideology, nationalism reaches across the state-society divide, combining an abstract polity, the sovereign state, with an abstract community, the nation. This national identification process that defines the boundaries between “us” and “them” is under increasing strain. How do people go “beyond exclusivism or identarian ideology in the world of transnational communications and global
relations”? (Balibar 1991). Clearly there can be no leap into a world of pluralist difference - nationalism remains a key means of contesting deepening global structural divides. But at the same time there is no possibility of ignoring globalism, and vacating politics beyond the national.

These twin pressures are producing a form of politics that is not enclosed in the zero-sum logic of nationalism and globalism. Walker argues this form of “movement politics” resists institutional containers; it is a politics of ideological “flows” that cannot be tied-down into a hierarchy of levels (Walker 1994). Given the hierarchies of the states system, the local is conventionally contained in the national: increasingly, though, the containment is dissolving. In the face of neo-liberal globalism there is an urgent need to construct political identities that do not set one level against another. Rather than setting levels against one another, local against national, national against global, this form of politics balances levels of identification. There is no absolute spatial fix - levels are relativized.

Under globalism, collective identities - and resistance identities - flow within as well as beyond the national. As James argues, transnational integration allows “the intermeshing extensions of locality, nationality and globality...to qualify and enhance each other rather than, as the prophets of globalism would have it, be subsumed under the latest wave of rationalising, commodifying, information-charged development” (James 1996). Such a politics has profound implications for the forms of political identification, and for nationalism.

3. Cosmopolitan nationalism?

The suggestion here is that, as peoples respond to corporate globalization, nationalism is being adapted. We may be seeing a recovery of an internationalism bridging globalism and nationalism that approaches the original conceptualization of Marxist internationalism.

Re-reading Marx, Benner unearthed a model of internationalism that, as she put it, rests on a “multilateral conception of ‘human’ identity, rather than an abstract universalism” as the normative founding stone of Marxian internationalism (Benner, 1995). Benner stressed that Marx encouraged opposition movements to establish cross-national links founded on common aspirations, and thereby to forge political identities that did not depend on viewing other nations as barriers to freedom.

Here, the national and the international are woven together in the identification process - a perspective that has been articulated by many
nationalist revolutionaries, including for instance, the Irish socialist and republican, James Connolly, who expressed it in the much-quoted injunction that “the cause of labour is the cause of Ireland, the cause of Ireland is the cause of labour” (Berresford Ellis 1973).

In the contemporary period social movements are struggling to articulate and reinforce democratizing pressures across national and international contexts. The resulting fusion of national and international commitments may bring a radical realignment of nationalism, paradoxically re-gearing it to transnational ends. This may be conceptualized as a form of cosmopolitan nationalism, a deliberate oxymoron that highlights the contradictions between national and international commitments that movements have to negotiate in order to successfully pursue transnational strategies. Cosmopolitan nationalism is well illustrated, for instance, in West's concept of “feminist nationalism”, at face value a contradiction in terms, but in practice a necessary feminist praxis (West 1997).

This form of nationalism differs from ethno-nationalism, which prioritizes the exclusive interests of an ethnic group, identified as the nation, over other ethnicities, and over any broader non-ethnic aspiration. It also contrasts with civic nationalism, a form of nationalism that enlists universal values - such as democratic and human rights - in the service of nationally-defined political ends. The approach comes close to Yeatman's concept of “universalistic nationalism”, which enlists nationalism to universal ends (Yeatman 1994). Yet this, though, relies on asserting the existence of universal values, creating a false universal-particular dividing line. One person's universal value is very often another’s particularism - and vice versa; and, as noted, universalism can often be read as imperialism (Furedi 1994). From here it is a short step to conceptualizing universalistic nationalism as the ideology of imperial powers.

There are similar problems with concepts of post-nationalism which reject nationalism as a contradiction of universalism and as necessarily exclusivist. Advocates argue that whatever the utility of nationalism in the age of state-centered politics, the current era of transnational politics requires a superseding of nationalism. Ideologies of national unity are seen as a negation of the multiculturalism and hybridity that is a necessary component of transnational mobilization (Kearney 1997). But post-nationalism is in practice a form of civic patriotism that can look very nationalistic for those on the outside, and signals, as Fine points out, a hunting “for a moment of innocence within political life when all was enlightenment”, a moment that never existed (Fine 1996).
Elaborating on these distinctions, it is possible to correlate modes of social integration and forms of social solidarity with the various types of nationalism. As outlined in Table 1, three forms of integration can be distinguished: a mechanical form, reflecting relations of dominance and subordination; a relativist form, under which integration is the sum of individual decisions to cooperate; and a dialectical form, under which integration is shaped by social conflict. Under the first, social solidarity rests on appeals for tolerance; under the second, solidarity is founded on tactical or functional coincidences of interest; while under the third, solidarity emerges out of mutual identification with common goals.

These forms of integration and solidarity express or generate different types of nationalism. In the case of mechanical engagement, social domination within the nation is preserved, not undermined, and may be expressed as ethno-nationalism (Smith 1980). Relational engagement expresses and constructs a set of common values to which individual co-nationals can cohere, reflected in the civic form of nationalism, sometimes characterized as liberal nationalism (MacCornick 1996). Finally, dialectical engagement may be said to generate forms of transnational solidarity and a mutual identification across national divides, generating cosmopolitan nationalism.

**Table: Three forms of integration, solidarity and nationalism**

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<tr>
<th>mode of integration</th>
<th>basis of social solidarity</th>
<th>type of nationalism</th>
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<tr>
<td>mechanical</td>
<td>tolerance</td>
<td>ethnic</td>
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<tr>
<td>relational</td>
<td>common values</td>
<td>civic / liberal</td>
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<td>dialectical</td>
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For the first two categories, identification is limited by the boundaries of tolerance and shared values. The third suggests the possibility of boundary-free identification. The idea is drawn from a dialectical understanding of social solidarity, in which mutual recognition emerges from a dialogue leading to common identification or shared consciousness (Boloch and Mell 1994).
Solidarity of this sort has been described by some writers as a form of “transversal politics” (Yuval-Davis, 1997; Campbell, 1996). Transversality defines a politics of dialogue across difference, in which different points of departure are acknowledged, and mutually traversed, to permit common understanding. Such dialogue is unavoidably crosscut by power relations, and requires recognition “not only of differences but also the relational nature of those differences” (Brown 1997). Hence, genuine solidarity can only be constructed through a process of mutually recognizing privilege and subordination (Cox 1992).

4. Conclusions

The ideological stability of the states system is disrupted by the emergence of transnational socio-economic forces, and by the associated internationalization of the state. National democratic structures are undermined, but also new political opportunities open up, especially for international coalitions of social movements. Prospects for these democratizing forces hinge on the possibility of realigning national politics.

As popular sovereignty is increasingly carried by transnational social movements contesting corporate globalization, national political cultures may be re-geared to meet transnationally-defined goals rather than primarily national ones.

Counter-globalist social movements are constituting a range of dialogues across national differences, to define and pursue these common aspirations. Such dialogues, essential to the process of contesting globalism, are generating new forms of political community. These are grounded in national differences, and often deploy those differences in the process of challenging globalizing projects.

At the same time such movements deliberately transcend the national framework, embedding it in a broader cosmopolitanism. In the emerging political frameworks, national political cultures and nationalist identification remain a key foundation for mobilization, a political resource that is being harnessed not sidestepped by social movements pursuing cosmopolitan aspirations.

Such movements raise the possibility of contesting and democratising the process of transnational integration that currently so effectively disempower national systems of democratic representation. This does not mean an end to national politics, rather its realignment.
The new forms of political community paradoxically reach out beyond national-state borders into transnational communities of conscience. They express combinations of nationalism and cosmopolitanism, deeply contradictory and oxy-moronic, but no less potent. It seems Nairn’s Modern Janus remains with us - exploring new realms of cosmopolitan solidarity while retaining roots in past reservoirs of national solidarity.

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