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The WHO’s global surveillance system acts as a free virus collection and R&D department for the world’s largest vaccine companies, yet gives very little benefit back to the developing countries in terms of available vaccines. Angered by the inequity, Indonesia decided in 2007 to suspend its sharing of viruses with the WHO. This action sent shock waves around the world. It alerted many developing nations to the need for reform, while provoking companies and the developed nations to fight to maintain the status quo. The outcome is still to be determined, while the world awaits the next pandemic. Indonesia fights to change WHO rules on flu vaccines Edward Hammond In mid-2005, Indonesia began to suspect that something was badly wrong with the World Health Organisation’s influenza virus research system. In July of that year, a virulent new strain of the H5N1 “bird flu” cropped up in Indonesia, infecting poultry and, worse, people. [1] The world watched Indonesia, fearful that the virus might start spreading from human to human (and not just from poultry to humans), potentially triggering a pandemic. In late 2005, as the new virus type (called a “clade”) infected poultry, and several more human victims died in Indonesian hospitals, officials scrambled to respond to the unprecedented crisis. Previous outbreaks had occurred in other parts of south-east Asia, where officials had similarly struggled (and continue to struggle) to contain them. Indonesian health officials encountered disturbing problems. The antiviral drug Tamiflu, made by Switzerland’s Roche, was not available to them in large quantities at any price. [2] Although it has since lessened in importance, at the time Tamiflu was considered critical for treating and containing human infections. But rich countries had already locked up the supply, even though they were not the ones suffering H5N1 outbreaks. In addition to difficulty in acquiring drugs, Indonesia’s health and agriculture officials often faced criticism from abroad, as they worked to stamp out infections. [3] Many foreign commentators were unreasonable, and had little or no specific knowledge of circumstances in Indonesia. Often they based their criticisms on sources of questionable reliability, for example, nearly unintelligible and error-prone computer translations into English of Indonesian news articles written in Bahasa. [4] Another source was Andrew Jeremijenko, a disaffected Australian general medical practitioner working in Indonesia. Jeremijenko held jobs with the international petroleum industry in Indonesia and, simultaneously, at a US military laboratory in Jakarta called NAMRU-2, which was closed by Indonesian authorities in late 2008 (see Box 1). Jeremijenko’s tenure at the US military lab had ended in early 2006, and included friction with Indonesia’s health ministry over handling of H5N1 samples. Now a telemedicine entrepreneur (and local political candidate in a Brisbane suburb in 2006–7), Jeremijenko’s criticisms of the Indonesian government were frequently accepted at face value by news media and public health commentators in the North. [5] Despite the criticisms, and as has been customary for more than four decades, Indonesia shared the H5N1 viruses isolated from its victims with the WHO Global Influenza Surveillance Network (GISN). As is also customary, the viruses were shared without any material transfer agreement (MTA) or other document articulating rights over them. Not long thereafter, an Indonesian virus from the 2005 outbreak was selected by WHO GISN for use in vaccines. Indonesia was displeased to learn that, although the virus was sent by WHO labs to companies and other researchers, vaccine made from it would not be available to Indonesians. [6] Later, when patent claims on this and other H5N1 viruses emerged, Indonesia’s discontent grew further. How did it come to pass that WHO’s global surveillance system acts as a free virus collection and R&D department for the world’s largest vaccine companies, with familiar names such as Sanofi-Pasteur, Novartis, and Astra-Zeneca, yet gives very little benefit to developing countries? Global virus vacuum The GISN is WHO’s influenza laboratory network. [7] It exists to identify and characterise influenza viruses and to create and distribute virus seed strains that can be used to produce vaccines. The key labs in the system, called WHO Collaborating Centres, are all located in wealthy countries – Japan, the US, the UK, and Australia. Of these, the dominant facility is the US Centers for Disease Control in Atlanta, part of the US Department of Health and Human Services, whose technical capabilities significantly outstrip the others. Although the GISN in theory exists as a WHO-led international public health collaboration, in many respects it can be more accurately described as a global virus vacuum, acquiring and processing thousands of influenza samples every year, determining which are most appropriate for use in vaccines, and then handing over those strains and vaccine selections – for free – to industry, which is 90 per cent concentrated in the North. Although industry is the primary beneficiary of the WHO GISN, it views countries like Indonesia not with gratitude for providing viruses, but as markets. And since demand for influenza vaccine in the event of a pandemic will far outstrip production capacity, industry is uninterested in contracting to provide vaccine at affordable prices for developing countries, even if the wealthy countries where the vast majority of vaccine antigen is produced were to allow exports in the event of a global influenza crisis (which many observers find very doubtful). Best of all for industry, the international movement of influenza (and other) viruses in the WHO system has historically ignored the concept of sovereignty over genetic resources, and the equitable sharing of benefits derived from them. Thus, no protections against patent claims by companies and others are built into the WHO GISN system, nor do the Terms of Reference and other agreements that govern its operation reflect a significant commitment to equity and benefit sharing. [8] As a result, even though Indonesia and other countries cooperated with GISN labs that had been approved by and signed Terms of Reference with the World Health Organisation, they lost all legal rights over viruses sent to the WHO system. When attention later focused on a wave of patent claims being filed on GISN H5N1 viruses (see below), tensions grew. The fact that some of these patent claims were made by WHO GISN labs [9] themselves made matters worse, and showed WHO’s lack of interest in preventing predation of GISN’s public health goods by private interests. Indonesia in the dock Until 2007, WHO’s virus vacuum had operated for four decades with few objections being raised. However, fears of a new pandemic focused attention on influenza and, as a result, the GISN’s overt inequity became apparent. Stung by critics, a senior WHO official recently privately lamented that “nobody used to care about influenza”, suggesting – with some reason – that WHO Member States’ historic inattention to the GISN was in part responsible for its problems. [10] In 2007, with developing countries largely still unable to access H5N1 treatments, and the WHO Secretariat still embarrassed at the GISN’s inequity having been revealed, Indonesia suspended its sharing of viruses with WHO and came to the World Health Assembly (WHA) in Geneva determined make big changes to the WHO’s system. [11] Indonesia’s suspension of virus sharing sent a shock through the international scientific community and vaccine makers. Without access to Indonesia’s virus, H5N1 vaccine research and development in the North would be seriously impaired. Indonesia also objected to the patenting of GISN materials, raising concern from industry and other labs that viewed the GISN’s resources as free for appropriation. The suspension brought on another wave of international criticism, including from the WHO, which harshly accused Indonesia of “threaten[ing] global public health”. [12] This and other criticisms were picked up by news media and on the internet. Few of Indonesia’s critics, however, knew what the GISN was, let alone understood how it operates. Ignorance of the GISN and intellectual property issues among public health commentators and health writers commingled in a distorted feedback loop between press and bloggers, resulting in several articles erroneously asserting that Indonesia was claiming intellectual property rights over viruses and that this was interfering with the GISN’s public health work. [13] The reality was the complete opposite. Indonesia had not claimed intellectual property over any virus, had disavowed profiting from the virus and, in fact, one of its key objections was that WHO was allowing patenting of GISN materials. Many developed countries seemed caught off-guard by Indonesia’s determination to change the GISN. A series of WHO meetings have ensued since the 2007 World Health Assembly but have yet to agree on a solution. As it became clear that Jakarta was not content to merely register a protest and then resume the business of sharing viruses as usual, developed countries placed a series of obstacles, many still unresolved, in the path of reforming or replacing the GISN to make it fairer to developing countries. For instance, the US at first refused to accept that virus transfers should be conducted using an MTA. US negotiators said that this would be too burdensome, despite the fact that influenza viruses are routinely transferred inside the US using highly detailed MTAs, including when they are shared by US government agencies. The US and others also scrambled benefit-sharing language when it crept into the draft resolution, for example turning “access to genetic resources [viruses] and sharing of benefits arising therefrom” into “mandatory sharing of viruses in return for access to vaccines through regular market mechanisms”. [14] In other words, it fought for the status quo, resisting any suggestion of inequity in the GISN system. With EU support, the US has also promoted the idea that the revised International Health Regulations (IHR) require Indonesia to send viruses to the WHO. This would mean that Indonesia was violating an international agreement by not sending viruses to the GISN. But advancing this dubious argument was difficult, not least because the revised IHR doesn’t actually require the sharing of disease agents. In fact, a draft provision that would have done so was discarded because of US objections! The WHO Legal Counsel, to its discredit, refuses to put to rest the uncertainty about the IHR that has been created by the US and EU. Only reluctantly does WHO concede that there is no virus sharing requirement in the IHR per se. But when it does so, it invariably also insists on suggesting various ways in which the IHR might be reinterpreted to require virus sharing, thereby perpetuating confusion about actual requirements. The impression left is that the WHO is inappropriately politicking for itself, encouraging Member States to grant the WHO power to compel countries to send it viruses, bacteria, and other disease agents. A pandemic of patents Since 2007, NGO research has documented a recent and dramatic increase in patenting of influenza vaccines, especially H5N1 vaccines. This includes patent claims over WHO GISN materials shared by countries such as Indonesia, Thailand, and Vietnam. Not only have claims been made by private industry, they even extend to two WHO Collaborating Centres for influenza – the Centers for Disease Control and St Jude’s Children’s Research Hospital, both in the US. A hastily organised WHO consultation in Singapore began on 31 July 2007, only weeks after the WHA. Although the Singapore meeting was privately described by one WHO official as an attempt to “ambush” Indonesian negotiators, the ambush backfired when Indonesia tabled a detailed proposal to restructure the WHO system, including material transfer agreements, improved access to vaccines, and new terms of reference to govern the relationships between the WHO, GISN labs, industry, and developing countries. The WHO Secretariat watered down Indonesia’s proposal and put forward a “Chair’s Text” of largely unexplained provenance.[15] It mostly reflected US and EU positions, but was not introduced by those countries; rather, it simply appeared without explanation. Unsurprisingly, advances at Singapore proved difficult because developed countries were unprepared to negotiate in detail, having arrived instead apparently hoping simply to press Indonesia to drop its initiative. Subsequent negotiating sessions, led by the Australian health minister, have rehashed and reformulated this draft agreement. Before 2006, only one international patent application for an influenza vaccine had ever been filed with the term H5N1 in the claim. In 2006 there were five claims, followed by eleven in 2007, and seven by September 2008. US and EU companies account for nearly all applications. Source: WIPO/PatentScope It was not until the end of 2007 that signs of progress appeared. The US relented on the matter of an MTA (calling it “standard terms and conditions”), and the WHO began to wake up to modern genetic resource realities. At the end of a tough IGM negotiating session in Geneva, WHO Director-General Margaret Chan confessed to delegates that she hadn’t previously understood the positions of Indonesia and its allies, but that after listening to the negotiations she had “come to understand what is meant by equitable sharing of benefits”. The details, however, matter greatly. Having agreed to a material transfer agreement for WHO GISN biological materials, the IGM’s definition of those biological materials becomes highly significant. The influenza virus is very small. Its genome is about 12,500 genetic bases long, which is roughly one fiftieth the size of the smallest bacterium, and a much smaller fraction of that of higher organisms. The HA (hemagglutinin) and NA (neuraminidase) genes, which are of greatest interest for vaccines, are only about 1,750 and 1,350 bases long, respectively. [16] Small size coupled with a virus-engineering technology called reverse genetics makes lab synthesis of influenza genes and recreation of viruses by machines increasingly easy to accomplish. New technology also makes the virus relatively easy to manipulate genetically. Further, there are technical aspects of H5N1 vaccine development that encourage genetic manipulation of vaccine strains. As a result, even though they remain utterly dependent on WHO for sequence information, acquiring actual virus from the GISN is becoming less necessary for companies and other labs, who are increasingly able to synthesise influenza genes and viruses from published sequence data. Thus, if the definition WHO GISN materials excludes items such as synthesised copies and viruses that are slightly genetically altered, then companies can avoid proposed MTA requirements such as restrictions on patents as well as benefit sharing, including making vaccine technology freely available or mandatory contributions to a pandemic preparation fund for developing countries.
Now, WHO optimistically hopes that an agreement to reform or replace the GISN, presently called a “WHO Framework”, can be finalised and adopted at the World Health Assembly in May 2009. But the current draft text, despite several meetings and iterations, leaves many key issues unresolved, including restrictions on intellectual property, definitions of WHO materials, exact types and requirements for benefit sharing. The scope of the agreement also remains in question. WHO and developed countries have fought to restrict it to viruses isolated in humans. Yet WHO-selected human vaccines are also made from H5N1 viruses that come from animals, making any agreement that solely pertains to human-isolated viruses of limited utility. In addition, WHO has asked its Member States to send animal viruses to the GISN for a number of years (a fact that WHO officials embarrassingly forgot at an important negotiating juncture). In fact, one of the WHO’s collaborating centres, St Jude’s Research Hospital in Memphis, Tennessee (US), specifically focuses on collecting and evaluating influenza in animals. While it has been claimed that extending the WHO agreement into animal viruses conflicts with the domain of other intergovernmental organisations (FAO and OIE), in fact, this does not appear to be a major concern. That is because a distinction can be drawn between use of samples for human vaccine development and pandemic risk assessment, versus similar uses directed toward animal health.
Another unresolved issue is the boundaries of the WHO system. Many developing countries propose that the WHO system retain rights over GISN viral materials after they are transferred to industry and other labs. Industry would therefore assume certain commitments whenever handling materials sourced from GISN. The US and others, such as Japan, prefer that once materials are sent to industry then they pass out of the GISN system and, for instance, cease to be tracked by WHO’s new virus-tracking system (being implemented at the suggestion of Brazil and others). An important factor restraining an agreement is a lack of desire in the North to change the status quo. A cynical refrain among EU delegates in late 2008 was “We need their virus, they need our vaccine, and nobody needs this framework.” This feeling is certainly influenced by industry, which is strongest in Europe and has vastly outnumbered NGOs at the negotiating sessions. Industry has little desire to see the GISN changed either. Also intruding on the negotiations are industry concerns, seldom articulated, that agreement to benefit sharing for influenza virus could lead to pressure for concessions in other infectious diseases. In the meantime, the WHO GISN continues to operate, but Indonesia and several other countries have limited their sharing of H5N1 viruses with it. Nevertheless, a distinct danger exists that, if developing countries are not sufficiently united and do not insist upon benefit-sharing specifics, the new WHO Framework could mandate virus sharing without a commensurate mandate for companies to share benefits.
Turning the GISN into a more equitable system will require limiting patent claims. Developing countries, including the Africa Group, Thailand, Brazil, Indonesia, and others, have proposed that there should be no intellectual property over GISN materials and products that incorporate them. [17] The degree to which they are successful remains to be seen. Stopping patents, however, solves only one part of the problem. Flu vaccine production capacity is presently inadequate to supply the North, much less the South, in the event of a pandemic. And because production capacity is centred in the North, the South is at the end of queue to receive vaccine, meaning that it is likely to suffer disproportionate damage in a pandemic. To put it bluntly: Southerners will die, while Northerners will be vaccinated. To solve this problem, some developing countries are seeking to link use of GISN virus with technology transfer. Under this proposed system, when industry commercialises a vaccine made from GISN materials in the North, it would incur obligations to make its vaccine technology available in the South, by granting licenses, providing know-how, and making mandatory contributions to a fund designed to ensure that such transfers actually happen. Uncertainty currently abounds. Nobody can be sure of the timing and severity of a future pandemic, or even whether the H5N1 type of flu will prove to be the culprit. Preventing monopolisation of vaccine technologies and public health resources, however, will reduce the impact of future outbreaks. Indonesia’s stand has alerted many governments to inequities and the need to reform WHO’s virus collection system. But corporate and developed-country pressure for the status quo (or something closely resembling it) is strong. The outcome of the conflict is yet to be determined; but it can be hoped that the resulting system will improve public health by limiting corporate control and placing greater public health resources in the hands of developing countries. Going further Edward Hammond, Some Intellectual Property Issues Related to H5N1 Viruses, Research, and Vaccines, September 2008, available online, http://www.twnside.org.sg/title2/avian.flu/papers/patent.paper.pdf Third World Network’s collection of South–North Development Monitor (SUNS) articles on WHO pandemic influenza negotiations, http://www.twnside.org.sg/avian.flu_news.htm World Health Organisation home page for the Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Intergovernmental Meeting, http://www.who.int/gb/pip/ Immunocompetent. Blog providing occasional news and comment on WHO negotiations, http://immunocompetent.com GRAIN, “Germ warfare - Livestock disease, public health and the military–industrial complex”, Seedling, January 2008, http://www.grain.org/seedling/?id=533 GRAIN, “Viral times - The politics of emerging global animal diseases”, Seedling, January 2008, http://www.grain.org/seedling/?id=532 GRAIN, web page providing details of GRAIN publications, external documents and other resources on bird flu and its impact on small-scale farmers, http://www.grain.org/birdflu 1 - International Society for Infectious Diseases, “Avian Influenza, Human – East Asia (125): Indonesia, Confirmed”, ProMED-Mail, Archive No. 20050916.2736, 16 September 2005. 2 - Personal communication with Indonesian Health Ministry Officials, 2006–7. See also US Embassy, Jakarta, “Questions and Answers on Avian Influenza (Adapted from the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and the World Health Organization websites)”, updated 9 December 2005, http://tinyurl.com/czplu8 3 - See, for example, Peter Cave, “Failed Indonesia bird flu response concerns experts”, Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 25 February 2006, http://tinyurl.com/l7z2m 4 - See, for example, the active website Flutrackers.com, particularly its news forum, http://tinyurl.com/dfykxj 5 - See Peter Cave, “Failed Indonesia bird flu response concerns experts”, Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 25 February 2006, http://tinyurl.com/l7z2m 6 - Reuters, “Indonesia defends move to block virus sample sharing”, 16 July 2008, http://tinyurl.com/cl4paa 7 - The Global Influenza Surveillance Network’s web pages can be found on the WHO website, http://tinyurl.com/cf76xa 8 - See Core Terms of Reference for WHO Collaborating Centres for Reference and Research on Influenza, 12 October 2006 version, http://tinyurl.com/c6tnue 9 - See, for example, PCT Patent Application WO2007/100584, Antiviral Agents and Vaccines Against Influenza, published 7 September 2007, and lodged by the US Centers for Disease Control and National Institutes of Health. 11 - Fitri Wulandari, “Indonesia says WHO must set rules on H5N1 sharing”, Reuters, 12 February 2007, http://tinyurl.com/dgmtq8 12 - Fitri Wulandari and Ahmad Pathoni, “Indonesia to resume sharing bird flu virus samples”, Reuters AlertNet, 27 March 2007, http://tinyurl.com/bqofzk 13 - Geoff Thompson, “Indonesia claims ownership over strain of avian flu”, Australia Broadcasting Corporation AM programme, 1 February 2007, http://tinyurl.com/alx3d3 14 - These are not verbatim quotations, but an eye-witness’s paraphrase conveying the flavour of the discussion. 15 - This first Indonesian proposal was never published as an official WHO document. A proposal subsequently put forward by the African Group, however, reflected many of Indonesia’s ideas. The African proposal has been published as an “annex” to WHO document A/PIP/IGM/7, http://tinyurl.com/d62lfp 16 - Edward Hammond, Influenza strains and genes can be copied from sequence data, undermining the WHO flu benefit sharing system, paper prepared for Third World Network, July 2008, http://tinyurl.com/dmh6xo 17 - See, for example, the Africa Region proposal published as an “annex” to WHO document A/PIP/IGM/7, http://tinyurl.com/d62lfp Ref: seedling|seed-09-04-5 |
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