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The sugar-cane–ethanol nexus GRAIN The US and Brazil are, by far, the dominant centres of global ethanol production. Together they account for about 70 per cent of the ethanol currently produced in the world. Both of these countries also dominate the global export production of the crops from which they produce their ethanol. The US, which makes its ethanol out of maize, produces about 70 per cent of global maize exports. Brazil makes its ethanol from sugar cane, and today it accounts for over half of the raw sugar traded around the world. In these two countries, then, the supply of ethanol feedstocks occurs within global commodity chains, which are tightly controlled by a few transnational corporations and influenced by trade relations. [1] Brazil’s emergence as a major sugar exporter began at the end of the 1980s when its sugar sector was liberalised. It was then that foreign investment started to flow in, expanding the scale and area of sugar production and orientHing the industry towards exports. But it was really only during the past few years that Brazilian sugar started flooding the global market. In 2004, Brazil won a key case at the World Trade Organisation against the EU sugar regime. Brazil’s victory undermined long-standing colonial trade and production routes, as well as the EU’s heavily subsidised export production. Today, sugar industries in Africa, the Caribbean, the Pacific and other parts of the world, which were sustained by preferential access to the EU, are in steep decline, even as the growing markets for ethanol raise the international price of sugar. Meanwhile, Brazilian sugar production is booming: the country’s share of global raw sugar exports surged from 7 per cent in 1994 to 62 per cent in 2006 and, over the past four years, its exports of sugar and ethanol increased by 243 per cent. [2]
In this new context, where sugar corporations are consolidating their operations and expanding into low-cost areas of production, Brazil has become their main target for investment. Bajaj Hindusthan, for instance, India’s largest sugar producer, set up a Brazilian subsidiary in 2006 and earmarked US$500 million for immediate investment in the country. “If I need to grow exponentially, I need to be in Brazil”, said Kushagra Nayan Bajaj, the company’s CEO. “If an investor expects another tenfold increase out of me in the next five years, or three years, I can’t do it in India.” [3] The boom in Brazilian ethanol production is therefore happening alongside a more general boom in the country’s sugar production. And, as with the palm-oil nexus, the sugar producers are quickly using this opportunity to secure control over the international sugar-cane ethanol market, positioning themselves to take advantage of both the rise in global prices for raw sugar and the growing demand for ethanol.
The Brazilian government plays a key role in facilitating this corporate consolidation. President Lula and his cabinet ministers are on a seemingly constant ethanol booster tour, striking deals around the world for the supply of Brazilian ethanol and technology. Much of the government’s support to the industry occurs via the state oil company, Petrobrás, which is actively developing the export infrastructure. Its latest project is a US$750-million ethanol pipeline, stretching 800 miles from Brazil’s interior to the Petrobrás refinery in Paulinia and then onward to the port of São Sebastião. The pipeline will have the capacity to transport nearly half of Brazil’s present ethanol production. Petrobrás is also more directly involved in securing long-term export markets for Brazilian ethanol. In 2005, it entered into an agreement with Japan’s state oil company Nippon Alcohol Hanbai, to create Brazil–Japan Ethanol, a joint venture that plans to export 1.8 billion litres of ethanol per year to Japan. [4] In March 2007, as part of an US$8-billion partnership worked out between Japan and Brazil, Petrobrás, Mitsui and Itochu agreed to set up a Brazilian joint venture that would supply ethanol to Japan for at least the next 15 years. The two sides also began negotiations for the construction of a pipeline within Brazil to facilitate these exports. [5] The big winners in Brazil’s emergence as the global sugar and ethanol powerhouse are the transnational corporations and the few families, known in Brazil as the sugar barons, who increasingly control the Brazilian sugar and ethanol industry. With foreign investors knocking on their doors, the sugar barons have been consolidating their holdings and restructuring their companies in order to attract foreign investment. Some have even put their family businesses on to the Brazilian stock exchange. Typically, what happens is that foreign investors buy up controlling interests or minority stakes, leaving the sugar barons, with their expertise in maximising productivity by exploitation, to oversee the agricultural operations. Brazil’s sugar barons have used this flood of finance, from foreign investors and the government, to take over smaller firms and expand production for export. Between 2000 and 2005, 37 mergers and acquisitions took place within the country’s sugar and ethanol industry. [6] Today it is possible to discern just a few conglomerates – transnational networks of TNCs and sugar families – that control the industry. Two of the most important are the Crystalsev and the Ometto conglomerates. Brazil is attracting more international investments in agrofuels than any other country. In 2006 alone, over US$9 billion were invested in the Brazilian ethanol industry, with US$2 billion going into the construction of new ethanol plants. [7] A number of multi-million dollar investment funds have recently been set up on foreign stock exchanges with the specific objective of investing in Brazilian ethanol (see table 5 on page 23). The new money is pushing sugar production into new areas, particularly on to lands that have long been used for cattle pasture. Eduardo Pereira de Carvalho, the President of São Paulo’s Sugar-Cane Manufacturers’ Union, predicts that as much as a third of Brazil’s current pasture land will be converted to sugar-cane production in the near future. “Over the next 15 years, an extra 100 million hectares could be planted with cane, primarily on pasture land”, he said. [8] The expansion of Brazilian sugar and ethanol has repercussions beyond Brazil’s borders. The glut of money is spilling over into neighbouring countries, which offer even lower costs of production and/or strategic trade access to the US market. The Brazilian government recently signed a US$100-million agreement with its Ecuadorian counterpart to set up two ethanol plants in Ecuador and to introduce high-yielding varieties of Brazilian sugar cane. Ecuador has two advantages to offer foreign investors: the 10,000-tonnes-per-year quota it has for the US market; and the unlimited access it has been given to the EU market as part of a diversification programme to encourage farmers to move away from away from illegal crops such as coca. Similar deals have been forged with Caribbean countries that have trade access to the US through the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI). [9] The Brazilian trading group Coimex has a joint venture in Jamaica with Petrojam to invest US$7.3 million in the rehabilitation of a 40-million-gallon ethanol production plant that will import all of its raw material from Brazil and ship all of its output to the US ethanol market. Jamaica is one of a number of small countries whose sugar sectors are in danger of completely collapsing when the EU Sugar Protocol begins to be phased out in 2007. And, like Jamaica, most of these countries are in a process of deep restructuring that they are carrying out with EU support. In these processes, ethanol is often proposed as a way to salvage part of the industry, but typically alongside privatisation plans that put the ethanol production and trade into the hands of foreign corporations. Mauritius, for instance, which is the largest supplier of sugar to the EU, holding 38 per cent of the quota within the Sugar Protocol, is negotiating an assistance package with the EU to restructure its sugar industry. As it stands, the EU will provide over 300 million euros towards the formation of a sugar-cane “cluster” in the country that will essentially centralise, mechanise and consolidate the country’s small-scale sugar production and reorient it towards energy production, primarily ethanol. [10] Much is made of how the cluster will serve local energy needs, but already the bulk of the island’s ethanol is exported to Europe. The ethanol business in Mauritius is controlled by Alcodis, a joint venture company that is part of the Belgian shipping conglomerate AlcoGroup. The group handles about 8 per cent of the ethanol traded in the world, most of its sourced from its Brazilian operations but some also coming from both its subsidiary in South Africa, NCP Alcohols, and its plant in Mauritius. In 2004 Alcodis shipped over 3.5 million litres of ethanol to the EU from Mauritius – tax-free because of its status as an ACP (African, Caribbean or Pacific) country. [11] Table 5. Investment funds for Brazilian ethanol
Latin America’s regional bank, the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), is another major player shaping and supporting the unfolding ethanol agribusiness web. It works closely with the Interamerican Ethanol Commission to develop the global market for ethanol, through a twin strategy of expanding ethanol production and consumption. IDB President, Luis Alberto Moreno, is one of the chairs of the commission, along with former Florida Governor Jeb Bush and former Brazilian Minister of Agriculture Roberto Rodrigues, who is now president of the Superior Council of Agribusiness of the São Paulo State Federation of Industries. Oddly, the bulk of IDB ethanol funds are channelled into the already saturated market for Brazilian ethanol production. The IDB says that in Brazil it is “focusing on leveraging private sector investments to expand production capacity”. Its Private Sector Department is currently structuring senior debt financing for three Brazilian ethanol production projects that will have a total cost of US$570 million and loans for five biofuel projects worth around US$2 billion are in the pipeline. In March 2007, the World Bank’s soft loan department, the International Finance Corporation, announced a US$35-million package for the construction in Brazil’s main sugar producing state, São Paulo, of a sugar mill that will source its cane from land currently devoted to pasture for cattle.
The project in São Paulo says a lot about how the ethanol industry is being shaped in the region. The mill brings together Brazil’s Unialco S.A., whose major trading partner in 2006 was Cargill, with Inversiones Manuelita of Colombia and Pantaleon Sugar Holdings of Guatemala, both of which are run by notorious local sugar barons. The Herrera family controls Pantaleon and more or less all of Guatemala’s sugar industry, while Manuelita, the second-largest Colombian-based sugar producing group and one of the main sugar producers in Peru, is part-owned by Colombia’s most powerful sugar baron, media mogul and agrofuel booster, Ardila Lülle. Pantaleon and Manuelita are investing in these joint ventures through their Spanish-based joint holding company, Grupo Colgua. [12] The initial announcement for the project talked about serving local ethanol markets, but, with the ink on the deal hardly dry, the three companies made a subsequent announcement for another joint investment – a US$20-million factory in Guatemala that will hydrate Brazilian ethanol for export to the US. References 1 Corporate control of the US maize ethanol market is discussed in Grist magazine’s December 2006 special series on biofuels. See: http://tinyurl.com/2r6k5m 2 Groupes Sucres et Denrées website, “Sugar Market”: http://www.sucden.com “Brazilian agribusiness exports doubled in four years”, Anba, 11 January 2007, http://tinyurl.com/37tsql 3 Pratik Parija and Thomas Kutty Abraham, “Bajaj plans to expand into Brazil”, Bloomberg News, 22 August 2006, http://tinyurl.com/2o3g32 8 Peter Blackburn, “Brazil could double ethanol output by 2014 – UNICA”, Reuters, 4 August 2006, http://tinyurl.com/ypqrrw 12 See Héctor Mondragón, “Los negocios del biocombustible y de la caña de nuestros empresarios y el gobierno nacional”, May 2007, http://tinyurl.com/2vtkfh Ref: seedling|seed-07-07-3c-en |
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