| Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (TRIPS)
Article 27: Patentable Subject Matter
3. Members may also exclude from patentability:
(b) plants and animals other than micro-organisms, and essentially
biological processes for the production of plants or animals
other than non-biological and microbiological processes.
However, Members shall provide for the protection of plant
varieties either by patents or by an effective sui generis
system or by any combination thereof. The provisions of
this subparagraph shall be reviewed four years after the
date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement.
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Introduction
The TRIPS Agreement is one of the pillars of the global
trade regime which is enforced through the World Trade Organisation (WTO).
TRIPS defines minimum standards of protection for intellectual property
rights (IPR) in the 135 WTO member states. Section Five, devoted to patents,
states that inventions in every field of technology should be patentable.
This includes life forms. And this is highly controversial.
Under TRIPS, WTO member states must provide patent protection
over micro-organisms and microbiological processes, such as those used
in biotechnology today. Countries are free to exclude plants and animals
from their patent laws. However, all nations must provide intellectual
property titles over plant varieties, either through patents or through
an 'effective sui generis system'. Article 27.3(b), in which these
rules are spelled out, was due to be reviewed in 1999.
This paper summarises what occurred with the review of
TRIPS Article 27.3(b) in 1999. It shares GRAIN's understanding of how
far developing countries are in the process of implementing the obligation
to provide IPR over plant varieties. And it ends with an appeal to act
seriously, now, on the proposals advanced by many South governments, viz.
a thorough review of the provisions of Article 27.3(b), an extension of
the transition periods and the resolution of outstanding issues such as
the call to clarify that life forms should not be patentable.
1. WHAT HAPPENED TO THE 1999 REVIEW OF ARTICLE 27.3(b)?
TRIPS is a product of the last round of GATT negotiations,
which took eight years to conclude (1986-1994). IPR was an entirely new
item on that negotiating agenda. It was the United States which argued
for its inclusion under pressure from the pharmaceutical industry, representatives
of which drafted the basic language for discussion. The developing countries
fought against the introduction of IPR into the world trade talks. They
argued that different economies need different tools to stimulate innovation
and that imposing uniform rules to protect monopoly rights in the form
of IPR would benefit foreign multinationals more than their own industries.
By reason or by coercion, the US won and TRIPS became the third pillar
of the world trade regime along with goods and services.
The whole matter of IPR over life forms was particularly
controversial. The US wanted full patent protection for all fields of
technology but the Europeans prohibit patents on plant and animal varieties,
and essentially biological processes for the production of plants and
animals, under the European Patent Convention. A compromise was reached:
TRIPS would use the language of European law as a starting point. That
language is embodied now in TRIPS Article 27.3(b) under the proviso that
countries would review the provision four years after the coming into
force of the Agreement, i.e. in 1999.
Developing countries had positive hopes for the 1999
review of 27.3(b). The exercise was taking place one year before they
were obliged to implement the provision. This was important because the
provision itself was the source of tremendous uncertainty in the South
(see Box 1). Many people hoped that TRIPS could be clarified through the
review and, if possible, amended to better suit the development interests
of the South, particularly since Third World countries were hardly heard
during the GATT negotiation itself.
| Box 1: Problems embedded in Art. 27.3(b)
There are extraordinary problems with Article
27.3(b) of the TRIPS Agreement:
* No parameters for what a 'sui generis'
system can amount to.
* No parameters for what is 'effective'.
* Many WTO members have expressed their view
that genes and microbiological processes are not inventions
and therefore are not patentable subject matter.
* With its lack of any benefit-sharing mechanism,
TRIPS offers no remedy for the ongoing wave of biopiracy and
is perceived as exacerbating the problem.
* There is a bias ingrained in TRIPS to protect
breeders and biotechnologists at the expense of farmers and
local communities.
* Many countries perceive a conflict between
TRIPS and the rights and obligations countries previously
acquired under the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD).
In addition, there is evidence that plant variety
laws inspired by the Union for the Protection of New Varieties
of Plants (UPOV) have no positive impact on food security1,
a matter that the TRIPS Council has not looked into.
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One year after the launch of the review, what can we
say about it? Overall, it has been a disappointment. The review started,
but it did not end. Developing countries made concrete recommendations
for clarification of TRIPS, but these were not acted upon. Finally, the
deadline for implementation of Article 27.3(b) in developing countries,
1 January 2000, arrived before any conclusions could be drawn from the
mandated re-examination of the text. In sum, although the review has not
been a failure, it does not seem to have been very effective.
Retracing the debate2
December 1998: The review essentially took off
during the TRIPS Council session in December 1998, when the agenda was
defined. At that sitting, industrialised countries took the first shot
by motioning to focus the review on how countries are implementing Article
27.3(b). The South objected, arguing that the Article mandates a review
of the provisions, or substance, of the sub-paragraph, not its implementation.
Furthermore, only developed countries were obliged to have implemented
by then, so the breadth of the review would be quite limited. In spite
of this, the session ended with a mandate on the Secretariat to collect
information about how countries were implementing 27.3(b).
February 1999: At this next session of the TRIPS
Council, the Secretariat provided the information it had collated on implementation
so far. Twelve countries had responded to a questionnaire, including a
lone informant from the South, Zambia. The discussion lasted 20 minutes
before the members decided to request the Secretariat to repackage the
material for the next meeting, so that they could better digest it.
April 1999: By this time, 30 countries had submitted
information on implementation. During the discussion, the US and Europe
argued that what should be completed in the course of the year is a review
of implementation. They also allegedly stated that they had open minds
about reviewing the provision itself3.
July 1999: At this session, discussion on the
substance of the provision itself finally commenced. India presented a
paper outlining its basic analysis of Article 27.3(b) and the problems
posed to developing countries. According to India, there are two dimensions
to deal with: the need to re-examine whether patenting life is acceptable
in terms of ethics; and the need to recognise not only formal systems
of innovation but informal systems as well, especially with regard to
biodiversity. In particular, India insisted on the need to reconcile TRIPS
with the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD). The developing countries
supported India. The developed countries evaded India. Malaysia took the
discussion a step further by asking the Secretariat to prepare a list
of sui generis options outside of UPOV.
It is important to signal that around this time, the
preparations for the WTO's Third Ministerial Conference, to be held in
Seattle on 30 November - 3 December, entered a critical phase. Between
the July and October sessions of the TRIPS Council, almost 100 developing
countries signed onto a near dozen proposals to reform TRIPS as far as
biodiversity and indigenous knowledge were concerned (see Table 2, annexed).
These proposals were tabled in the WTO's General Council for negotiation
at the Ministerial. The Africa Group's position was the first and most
substantial from the South4. It proposed an
extension of the deadline to implement TRIPS 27.3(b) in the developing
countries so that the review may proceed and conclude properly. It also
enumerated what the Africa Group would like to see clarified through the
review: that patents on life should be prohibited, including those on
microbiological processes. The LDCs stated that they wished to achieve
the same clarification in the Agreement. An extension of the transition
period plus a clarification of what TRIPS may allow in the sphere of patenting
amounted to a proposal for a moratorium on implementation of the current
text, in the eyes of many.
October 1999: Back in the TRIPS Council, the South
continued to proactively shape the frame for a review of the provisions
of Art. 27.3(b), while the North also dived into issues of substance.
India and the Africa Group each tabled further papers, basically restating
and elaborating upon positions presented earlier. In addition, the Africa
Group formally submitted its Seattle position for deliberation by the
TRIPS Council5. The United States argued that
the patenting of life forms has tremendous advantages, that UPOV '91 is
what Washington would consider an effective sui generis system,
and that there is no conflict between TRIPS and the CBD6.
Europe supported the US perspective, although it indicated that it was
prepared to take into account the need to deal with ethics and, by way
of example, provide protection for traditional knowledge systems. The
EU also urged all WTO members to adopt sui generis legislation
conform with UPOV '91. Norway said it was taking a middle ground in that
biotechnology and IPR are important but not at the expense of the ethics
of patenting life, the need to ensure benefit-sharing and the need to
ascertain the compatibility of TRIPS with CBD. Australia said the review
of 27.3(b) should proceed after developing countries implement it!
Seattle and post-Seattle
Then came Seattle. Beyond the tear gas, a negotiating
text reflecting proposals on TRIPS from the Africa Group and the Like-Minded
Group of developing countries was on the table. One 'Green Room' session,
involving a limited number of participants, looked at the TRIPS chapter
but did not conclude anything. As the Conference was 'suspended' without
any agreement on where negotiations stood or how they would proceed, the
status of all these ideas and demands is unclear. What is clear is that
they were officially tabled and they have not been properly deliberated
or decided upon.
At the December 1999 meeting of the General Council,
two weeks after Seattle, the Chairman said that consultations on the Seattle
issues including TRIPS would continue after the New Year
and that countries should exercise 'restraint' in dealing with implementation
deadlines in the meantime7.
This is where the review of Article 27.3(b) stands at
present:
* The discussion was not completed in the TRIPS Council.
In fact, it is on the agenda for the Council's next session on 21-22
March 2000 .
* The proposals for clarification of Article 27.3(b)
channelled through the General Council for Seattle were not properly
deliberated or decided upon, even though such decisions would have profoundly
affected what the developing countries would have implemented by 1 January
2000, their original deadline.
* Most developing countries have not fulfilled their
obligation to implement the sub-paragraph, as we detail below.
In short, the review process so far has generated no
clarifications, no responses to precise proposals from the South, great
delays in getting down to the substance of the discussion and general
confusion at present about obligations and opportunities.
2. IMPLEMENTATION OF ARTICLE 27.3(b) IN THE SOUTH: STATE
OF PLAY
The vast majority of developing countries which are members
of WTO have been approaching their obligation to grant intellectual property
rights over plant varieties through 'an effective sui generis system'
whatever that means and not through patenting8.
The deadline to have such legislation in place9
was 1 January 2000 for developing countries.
Despite the threat of possible trade sanctions, however,
just a few managed to adopt such legislation in the final hour. We are
aware of only 21 developing country members of WTO which currently have
plant variety protection (PVP) legislation in place, listed in Table 1.
That would leave 76 WTO members in the South still lacking IPR protection
for plant varieties. Since 29 of those 76 are classed as 'least-developed'
countries (LDCs) and have a longer transition period ending 1 January
2006, we nevertheless face a situation where 47 Third World countries
could be considered targets at this moment for dispute proceedings in
Geneva on grounds of non-compliance with TRIPS Article 27.3(b).
Table 1: Developing country members of WTO which had
plant variety protection laws in place on 1 January 2000
| Africa & Middle East |
Asia-Pacific |
Latin America & Caribbean |
| Kenya*, Morocco, South Africa*, Zimbabwe |
Hong Kong, Korea, Thailand |
Argentina*, Bolivia*, Brazil*, Chile*, Colombia*,
Ecuador*, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama*, Paraguay*, Peru*, Trinidad
& Tobago*, Uruguay*, Venezuela* |
* Member of the Union for the Protection of
New Varieties of Plants (UPOV, Geneva), 1978 Act
Source: Information compiled by GRAIN from various sources, February
2000
In Africa, Kenya, South Africa and Zimbabwe adopted PVP
back in the 1970s. Morocco is the only African country we know of that
implemented some kind of sui generis law on plant varieties, for
the purpose of TRIPS, in 1999. Since for the purpose of WTO there are
24 LDC members in Africa, the remaining 21 members being developing countries,
80% of the African countries which should have implemented Article
27.3(b) by now have not.
In Asia, things are also moving slowly. Korea and Hong
Kong both adopted PVP, for the purpose of TRIPS, a few years ago. China
did the same, and went so far as joining UPOV last year, even though she
is not member of WTO. For the rest, only Thailand established a sui
generis regime last year. With Bangladesh, Maldives, Myanmar and the
Solomon Islands slated as LDCs in the WTO household, this means that in
the Asia-Pacific region as well, 80% of the countries which should have
implemented TRIPS Article 27.3(b) by now have not.
The situation in Latin America is somewhat different.
Southern Cone countries such as Argentina and Chile installed IPR regimes
over plant varieties several years back. Mexico established its PVP law
as a condition for joining NAFTA. The five Andean Community countries
adopted a regional regime, modelled on UPOV, under Andean Pact Decision
345. After some debate and much uncertainty, Brazil passed a national
PVP law in 1997 and joined UPOV last year. In the final run-up to the
TRIPS deadline itself, only Panama and Nicaragua passed new legislation.
With Haiti having the longer transition period for LDCs, we nevertheless
conclude that 56% of the Latin American and Caribbean states which
should have implemented TRIPS Article 27.3(b) by now have not.
Cumulatively, this means that 70% of the (non-LDC) developing
countries which participate in the WTO system are presently in arrears
of their obligations regarding TRIPS Article 27.3(b).
The accompanying graph gives the total picture in the
South right now, LDCs included.

Source: Information compiled by GRAIN from numerous sources, February
2000
This does not mean that the countries are inactive on
the legislative front. Far from it. India, Egypt and the Philippines have
final drafts under scrutiny by their national assemblies right now. Costa
Rica, Malaysia, Pakistan and Egypt are either discussing drafts or have
them awaiting Ministerial or Cabinet approval for submission to Parliament.
Many other countries are still drafting. For example, most of the member
states of the Organisation of African Unity are deeply engaged in a process
to develop national legislation based on a regional Model Law which was
only finalised last November. The OAU Model Law covers not only breeders'
rights but also farmers' rights, benefit-sharing and rules on access to
genetic resources. In francophone Africa, the 15 members of the Organisation
Africaine de la Propriété Intellectuelle revised the Bangui Agreement
in February 1999, incorporating a UPOV-based system of intellectual property
rights for plant varieties. But to the best of our knowledge, national
PVP laws drawn from the revised Bangui Agreement are not yet in force
in the member states10.
In the meantime, UPOV appears in a desperate state. Anxious
to envelope more countries in its fold, and thereby boost its credibility,
the UPOV Council decided last October to extend an open invitation to
India, Nicaragua and Zimbabwe to accede to the 1978 Act even though it
was officially closed to further accessions in 1998. If this sudden largesse
doesn't speak loudly enough, the Secretary-General of UPOV has announced
to colleagues that he will take an early retirement this year. UPOV is
even starting to change its tune and concede that countries can develop
effective sui generis legislation that is not 'essentially derived'
from the UPOV regime. These could all be signs that the belief in a ready-made
solution to the TRIPS 27.3(b) conundrum is crumbling.
What can we learn from all this? The message is that
despite four-year transition periods, despite best intentions to bear
the cost of inclusion in the WTO trade system and despite all the pressure
and countless workshops organised by the industrialised world, including
UPOV, developing countries are not ready to implement TRIPS Article
27.3(b). And they have good reason to be in this state. Since
the mid-1990s, they have been under intense, often unilateral, pressure
from industrialised countries to follow the UPOV model of plant variety
protection as means of implementation something which many developing
countries strongly feel is not in their interest. The WTO itself joined
in this campaign by sponsoring a series of workshops for developing countries
on UPOV-as-sui-generis-solution at that same time that it was hosting
a review which was supposed to revisit the very provision. Then, proposals
from developing countries to clarify what the Article means, not only
through the TRIPS Council review but a Ministerial Conference, were not
dealt with. Finally, commitments to other treaties which TRIPS overlaps
with, viz. the CBD and the International Undertaking at FAO, coupled
with high sensitivity for the impact of TRIPS on biodiversity, have inclined
many developing countries to want to ensure that community rights and
farmers' rights are not torpedoed by rash legislation favouring industrial
plant breeders. This last factor has made the drafting work more complex
and heavy-going for the developing countries, but potentially less inimical
to the interests of their citizens than UPOV, WTO and rest of the industrialised
world would seem to have it.
Those developing countries which did adopt UPOV-based
PVP laws reacted understandably to all these conflicting pressures. But
they did so in most cases not all without meaningful consultation
or debate with those who will be most affected: the farming and indigenous
communities. They certainly did not, in any case, resolve the underlying
conflicts.
3. FOR A FULL-FLEDGED REVIEW
It is hard to escape the conclusion that a full and thorough
review of Article 27.3(b) is imperative. As stated before, the current
text is the result of a compromise between Europe and the USA, with no
proper consideration of the interests of developing countries or of the
principles embedded in the CBD and other international agreements. In
addition, the text as it stands is full of dangerous ambiguities. Rather
than bulldoze ahead and force inappropriate legislation upon developing
countries and their farmers, it is important to seriously review the Article
as originally agreed, and clarify its scope, meaning and objectives taking
into account all these interests and concerns.
In that context, the Africa Group has offered the most
comprehensive proposal on how to move forward and it merits full support
and active implementation without further delay. It can
be seen as leading to a moratorium in as much as it demands a thorough
review procedure, an extension of the transition periods, and specific
clarifications which would result in amendment of the treaty. However
one designates it, this is no way means that countries should abandon
their efforts to develop appropriate and balanced national systems of
rights in the meantime. On the contrary, putting the Africa Group's proposal
into action should provide the appropriate time and space for developing
countries to elaborate, in a more integrated and consultative way, legislation
that properly meets their needs. Protecting biodiversity, promoting its
sustainable use, and giving fair recognition to the rights and interests
of local communities and indigenous peoples cannot be sidelined from implementation
of TRIPS. Yes, these are objectives and issues that go far beyond the
scope of any world trade system. But they stand directly in the way of
the current WTO TRIPS Agreement.
In conclusion, putting the Africa Group's proposals into
action, now, is defensible on the grounds that:
1. The substantive review of 27.3b has not been concluded.
When TRIPS was adopted in 1994, it was agreed that
a review of the provisions of Article 27.3b would take place prior
to implementation in the South. The review commenced in 1999 and developing
countries raised many substantive concerns about the text, which they
themselves had hardly been involved in drafting. Four meetings of
the TRIPS Council in 1999 was not enough to complete the discussion
and the year ended with many countries requesting extensions of the
deadline and with serious concerns laid out on the table.
2. Specific demands to amend Art. 27.3(b), tabled
for Seattle, have not been dealt with.
The specific demands of nearly 100 developing countries
relating to TRIPS 27.3b are laid down in a series of proposals. These
proposals were submitted to the General Council in the latter half
of 1999, and transposed into a Ministerial negotiating text, but could
not be properly discussed in Seattle and have not been treated by
the TRIPS Council either. They are therefore still awaiting fair hearing,
discussion and response at the WTO.
3. There is strong popular support for the Africa
Group position.
Peoples' movements and NGOs, not to mention Parliaments,
lawyers and academies of science, from around the world have urged
their governments to support the position of the Africa Group11.
This indicates strong public appeal that should not be ignored, especially
on such a sensitive issue as establishing monopoly rights over the
basis of the food supply.
4. Together, the post-Seattle legitimacy slump of
WTO and the ongoing nature of the 27.3b review leave space for developing
countries to be proactive.
The collapse of the Seattle process could very well
mark the start of a new era in which developing countries increasingly
and successfully challenge the over-expanding reach and undemocratic
functioning of the WTO, and the way it has served the interests of
the industrialised world and its mega-corporations. In that context,
these are times to review and rebuild not to rush ahead and
adopt inappropriate IPR laws.
Footnotes:
1. GRAIN (1999). Plant
variety protection to feed Africa? Rhetoric versus reality, Barcelona,
October. http://www.grain.org/publications/reports/variety.htm
2. Unless indicated otherwise,
information on the TRIPS Council proceedings was kindly provided to GRAIN
by the Information and Media Division of the WTO over the course of the
past 15 months.
3. According to International
Centre for Trade & Sustainable Development, 'TRIPS Council discusses
plant patenting', BRIDGES Weekly Trade News Digest, Vol 3, No 15
& 16, Geneva, 26 April 1999.
4. Preparations for the
1999 Ministerial Conference: The TRIPS Agreement. Communication from Kenya
on behalf of the African Group. WTO, Geneva, WT/GC/W/302, 6 August
1999.
5. Statement by Kenya on
Behalf of the Africa Group: Article 27.3(b) of the TRIPS Agreement,
paper presented at the TRIPS Council, WTO, Geneva, 20 October 1999, 2
pp.
6. Article 27.3(b): Views
of the United States of America, paper presented at the TRIPS Council,
WTO, Geneva, 20 October 1999, 7 pp.
7. World Trade Organisation
Secretariat, General Council defers post-Seattle discussion until early
2000, WTO, Geneva, 17 December 1999
8. At present, only the United
States and the Republic of Korea explicitly provide patent protection
for plant varieties.
9. Some interpret this deadline
as one requiring that the process to implement was in motion, but not
necessarily completed.
10.
Cameroon ratified without parliamentary discussion but there
is still no national law in force. In the other countries, the ratification
process is reportedly stalled.
11.
See for example http://www.twnside.org.sg/title/273bst-cn.htm
ANNEX
Table 2: Official developing country proposals for
the review or renegotiation of TRIPS as regards biodiversity and associated
knowledge (1999)
| Stakeholder |
Patenting (life forms &
biological processes) |
Sui generis (plant varieties) |
| Kenyaa |
- Need five-year extension of transition period
- Harmonise TRIPS with CBD
|
- Need five-year extension of transition period
- Increase scope of 27.3(b) to include protection
of indigenous knowledge and farmers' rights
- Harmonise TRIPS with CBD
|
| Venezuelab |
In 2000, introduce mandatory system
of IPR protection for traditional knowledge of indigenous and
local communities, based on the need to recognise collective rights |
| Africa Groupc |
- Review should be extended + additional five year
transition after that
- Review should clarify that plants, animals, microorganisms,
their parts and natural processes cannot be patented
|
- Review should be extended + additional five year
transition after that
- Sui generis laws should allow for protection
of community rights, continuation of farmers' practices and
prevention of anti-competitive practices which threaten food
sovereignty
- Harmonise TRIPS with CBD and FAO
|
| LDC Groupd |
- There should be a formal clarification that naturally
occurring plants and animals, as well as their parts (gene sequences),
plus essentially biological processes, are not patentable.
- Incorporate provision that patents must not
be granted without prior informed consent of country of origin
- Patents inconsistent with CBD Art 15 (access)
should not be granted
- Need for extended transition period
|
- Sui generis provisions must be flexible
enough to suit each country's seed supply system
- Need for extended transition period
|
| Jamaica, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambiae |
No patenting plants without prior informed consent
of government and communities in country of origin |
|
| SAARCf |
There is a need to prevent piracy of
traditional knowledge built around bio-diversity and to seek the
harmonization of the TRIPS Agreements with the UN Convention on
Biological Diversity so as to ensure appropriate returns to traditional
communities. |
| SADCg |
- The transitional period for implementation of
27.3(b) should be extended and the 2000 review should be delayed.
- The review of 27.3(b) should harmonise TRIPS
with CBD.
- The exclusion of essentially biological processes
from patentability should extend to microbiological processes.
|
- The transitional period for implementation of
27.3(b) should be extended and the 2000 review should be delayed.
- The review of 27.3(b) should retain the sui
generis option.
|
| G77h |
Future negotiations must make operational
the provisions relating to the transfer of technology, to the
mutual advantage of producers and users of technological knowledge
and seek mechanisms for a balanced protection of biological resources
and disciplines to protect traditional knowledge |
| Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Perúi |
The Seattle Ministerial Conference should
adopt a mandate to: (a) carry out studies in order to make recommendations
on the most appropriate means of recognizing and protecting traditional
knowledge (TK) as the subject matter of IPR; (b) initiate negotiations
with a view to establishing a multilateral legal framework that
will grant effective protection to the expressions and manifestations
of TK; (c) complete the legal framework envisaged in paragraph
(b) above in time for it to be included as part of the results
of the new round of trade negotiations. |
a. WT/GC/W/23 of 5 July
1999
b. WT/GC/W/282 of 6 August 1999
c. WT/GC/W/302 of 6 August 1999
d. WT/GC/W/251 of 13 July 1999
e. http://www.foe.org/international/wto/govt.html
of 2 September 1999
f. WT/L/326 of 22 October 1999
g. WT/L/317 of 1 October 1999.
h. WT/MIN(99)/3 of 2 November 1999
i. WT/GC/W/362 of 12 October 1999
ACRONYMS
CBD United Nations
Convention on Biological Diversity
EU European Union
FAO United Nations Food and Agriculture
Organisation
GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
G77 Group of 77 developing
countries at the United Nations
IPR intellectual
property right(s)
LDC least-developed country
NAFTA North America Free Trade Agreement
SAARC South Asia Association for Regional Cooperation
SADC Southern Africa Development Cooperation
TK traditional knowledge
TRIPS Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights
UPOV Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants
WTO World Trade Organisation
FOR
FURTHER INFORMATION
GRAIN
Girona 25, pral.
08010 Barcelona Spain
Tel: (34-93) 301 13 81 | Fax: (34-93) 301 16 27
Email: | Web: www.grain.org
|