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INTRODUCTION
In the next few months, the International Rice Research
Institute (IRRI), based in Los Baños, Laguna, the Philippines, plans to
conduct its first open field test of a transgenic variety of rice in Southeast
Asia. IRRI will conduct the field tests in collaboration with its national
counterpart, the Philippine Rice Research Institute (PhilRice). The first
transgenic rice that IRRI and PhilRice plan to test has been genetically
engineered to resist bacterial blight (hence the short-hand "BB rice").
IRRI intends to conduct its field test at the University of the Philippines
Los Baños (UPLB) Central Experiment Station, while PhilRice plans to conduct
its field test at the PhilRice experimental site in Maligaya, Muñoz, Nueva
Ecija.
While IRRI has already conducted experiments on this
transgenic rice under contained conditions at its headquarters in Los
Baños, its planned field test in the open environment marks an entirely
new stage in the deployment of rice biotechnology in Asia. Once IRRI and
PhilRice carry out the trials, transgenic rice will only be a short step
from farmers’ fields. Presently, to our knowledge, only China has
conducted widespread field tests of transgenic rice in Asia. IRRI's move,
however, has a resolutely international objective: to deploy genetically
engineered rice throughout the region. That is why IRRI's first field
test calls for a close inspection of the issues at hand.
The most immediate question concerning the field test
of BB rice is that of risk. Genetic engineering is vastly different from
other methods used by breeders. While all other processes for breeding
rely on natural functions of organisms, genetic engineering moves genes
from one organism to another in ways that could never be possible in nature.
The science is not precise and the interactions between the genetically
engineered organism and the surrounding environment are unpredictable.
For this reason, many countries have adopted stringent regulations over
the field release of transgenic crops.
The impacts of transgenic crops go well beyond biosafety,
however. There are many potentially severe socioeconomic impacts or "risks"
associated with the technology. Before a technology is accepted, questions
must be answered about how it will impact the long-term welfare of communities
and there must be a decision-making process where the affected community
can make its own judgements about whether or how the technology should
be used. A thorough assessment would look not only at the environmental
consequences but also at who controls the technology, who stands to benefit
from it, and, not least important, what alternative solutions exist.
In the Philippines, where the field test of BB rice will
take place, these larger questions were acknowledged in the establishment
of the National Committee on Biosafety in October 1990 and the subsequent
publication of its biosafety guidelines. The guidelines, the first of
their kind in Southeast Asia, clearly state:
Genetic manipulation of organisms should be allowed
only if the ultimate objective is for the welfare of humanity and
the natural environment and only if it has been clearly stated that
there is no existing or foreseeable alternative approaches to servicing
the welfare of humanity and the environment. 1
And:
The proponent must demonstrate – taking into
consideration scientific, ecological, economic, social and ethical
concerns – that the proposed objectives of the research …
cannot be addressed/realized adequately and achieved by alternative
approaches. 2
These larger questions surrounding the field release
of BB rice in the Philippines can only be properly addressed through meaningful
public consultation, especially with those who will be most affected –
the farmers.
The stakes in this debate are high. BB rice, as IRRI
knows, will set a precedent. A favorable decision on the pending field
test application will set the wheels in motion to take agriculture, throughout
South and Southeast Asia, deep into biotechnology. Therefore, as stipulated
by the Philippines’ biosafety guidelines, this is the time to reflect
on the possible alternatives and to ask how agricultural development for
Southeast Asia’s most important crop should proceed, both in the
Philippines and the region.
1. EMERGENCE OF A BACTERIAL BLIGHT PROBLEM
Bacterial blight was first reported in the Fukuoka Prefecture,
Japan, in 1884. The disease (see box) was unknown in the area until farmers
began using soybean cake and green manure to fertilize their lowland rice
fields.3 This was the first clue that bacterial
blight has a voracious appetite for mixtures of rice and nitrogen. Since
then, the disease has traveled the world to settle in places where the
two are found in abundance.
| What is bacterial blight?
Bacterial blight is a water-borne disease.
It infects rice plants when droplets carrying the bacteria (Xanthomonas
oryzae pv. oryzae) land on leaf wounds, which are
caused by a range of factors including heavy rains and typhoon
winds. Rice plants are more susceptible to the disease under
high temperatures and humidity, and when nitrogen fertilizers
are used. Given the factors that contribute to bacterial blight,
cultural management is an obvious and effective means for farmers
to control the disease.
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Bacterial blight only became significant in Southeast
Asia forty years ago.4 Before then, the traditional
practices and varieties of rice farmers kept the disease at bay. The situation
changed drastically in 1959 when IRRI was established by the Rockefeller
Foundation. IRRI introduced IR8 – its first semi-dwarf, nitrogen-responsive
variety – in 1966 and within a few years, IR8, along with the chemical
fertilizer it required, blanketed the region.
The susceptibility of IRRI’s prized high-yielding
varieties (HYVs) was immediately apparent.5
In 1970, the Japanese Technical Cooperation Agency (JTCA) warned, "It
is clear that such varieties are assisting the disease to spread wider.6"
The JTCA’s Director-General questioned the logic behind the use of
HYVs to increase production:
[Bacterial blight] has made little harm as far as
local varieties had been cultured without any fertilization …
But almost all HYV varieties which these [Southeast Asian] countries
have adopted are very susceptible to bacterial blight. Besides, they
require a large amount of fertilizer, which, therefore, is considered
to be a big barrier to the implementation of increased production
of rice.7
But IRRI had other ideas and it, along with its local
counterparts, continued to push IR8 far and wide, even into those areas
most vulnerable to bacterial blight and other diseases. The area planted
with HYVs in the Southeast Asian countries using IRRI varieties jumped
from 1.4 million hectares in 1966 to 34.4 million hectares in 1980. There
was a similar increase in fertilizer use – soaring from 1.4 million
tons in 1965 to 9.6 million tons in 1980.8
Results were as expected. In fields planted with HYVs,
bacterial blight often cut yields by 20 to 50 percent throughout the 1960s.
All over Southeast Asia epidemics broke out, with loss of yields as high
as 80 percent in some areas.9 Problems were
compounded by the fact that the disease becomes more virulent in the presence
of susceptible hosts, especially under monoculture conditions. Uniform
crops exert selection pressure on the disease, and those strains of the
disease for which the rice has no defense end up quickly dominating the
other populations.10
At first, researchers looked to agrochemicals to get
out of the mess they had created. But most agrochemicals proved ineffective
against bacterial blight and those that offered some protection were too
hazardous and destructive for use on rice farms. 11The
next option was to seek a solution through breeding. Luckily for IRRI,
some farmers in southern India stuck with traditional varieties –
which may have produced lower yields, but were durable against disease.
IRRI collected one of these varieties, named TKM6, labeled its resistance
gene as Xa4, and then quickly set to work trying to breed the gene into
its HYVs. The first IRRI variety incorporating the Xa4 gene was launched
in 1969 and since then almost every rice variety bred at IRRI or by its
national counterparts has incorporated the gene. In the 1980s, about 90
percent of the rice land in the Philippines was planted with varieties
possessing the Xa4 gene.12
Xa4 did provide some immediate relief, but the problem
was far from resolved. To its dismay, IRRI soon learned that it had unleashed
a highly adaptable disease that would not be so easy to conquer. By 1972,
only three years after the first high-yielding Xa4 variety was introduced,
bacterial blight was once again wreaking havoc on farms sown with HYVs.
As recognized later by IRRI, "The widespread deployment of rice varieties
containing bacterial blight resistance genes has brought about significant
changes in the population structure of Xanthomonas oryzae pv.
oryzae (Xoo)." IRRI’s Xa4 varieties could resist one race
of Xoo, but, with the widespread use of the gene in HYVs, a second
race of Xoo emerged that Xa4 could not withstand. Within a few
short years, that race accounted for 80 percent of the bacterial blight
population. Today, as new resistance genes are identified and incorporated
into IRRI lines, the disease continues to adapt, as in the Philippines,
where a third race of bacterial blight dominates.13
Bacterial blight continues to cause significant damage
in rice fields in Asia and it has spread to Africa, Latin America, USA
and Australia.14 In 1996 IRRI reported:
New forms of Xoo have emerged in many localities.
The disease is a chronic, low-level problem in many countries, and
local epidemics (such as in the Punjab in 1994) are still a threat
almost everywhere rice is grown.15
| Diversity to the rescue
Within a few short years, IRRI and its national
counterparts brought bacterial blight to epidemic proportions
in areas of the world where it had never been a problem or even
existed. Fortunately, farmers have pursued a more cautious approach
and, over generations, have produced a number of disease-resistant
varieties.
By collecting farmer varieties and "wild"
material throughout the world, IRRI has now identified around
2,200 lines resistant to bacterial blight.16 The bulk of these varieties come from three
geographic centers: one in the area comprising Bangladesh, Nepal
and North-East India, a second in Southern India and Sri Lanka,
and a third in Java and the surrounding islands.17
By incorporating these resistant varieties
into their breeding program, IRRI has managed to keep infestation
of bacterial blight at manageable levels, with the exception
of the occasional outbreak. The situation, however, is far from
stable and IRRI remains in a race to, as it says, "stay
one step ahead of bacterial blight."
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2. ENTER BB RICE
In 1977, a scientist with the Central Rice Research Institute
(CRRI) in India obtained a strain of a wild rice, Oryza longistaminata,
from Mali, West Africa. At CRRI, the rice was tested for resistance to
bacterial blight and was found to be resistant to a number of strains.
In 1977, IRRI’s head breeder, Dr. Gurdev Khush, visited the Rice
Research Institute of Rajendra Agricultural University at Mithapur, India,
and obtained a sample of the O. longistaminata, which had been
distributed to the University by CRRI. Dr. Khush brought the African rice
back to IRRI and for the next twelve years led an intensive breeding project
to transfer blight resistance from O. longistaminata into IRRI’s
HYV, IR24. In the course of their breeding activities, IRRI scientists
found that the resistance could be the work of one gene, which they named
Xa21, found on a small region of a particular chromosome. By 1990, they
were able to isolate this gene and breed it into the IR24 variety to produce
a new resistant line, dubbed IRBB21. In all, the development of IRBB21
took eleven seasons, suggesting that in tropical countries the breeding
of resistant lines through conventional crossing with wild varieties takes
six years.18
It was at this time that Dr. Pam Ronald began to work
on the Xa21 gene at Cornell University, in the United States, in collaboration
with IRRI staff stationed there. Using a sample of IRBB21, she began a
project to identify the precise location of the Xa21 gene in the rice
genome. Once the gene could be located, she would then be able to clone
it and use it in genetic engineering. In the midst of her work, Ronald
left Cornell for a faculty position with the University of California,
Davis, also in the US. There, she succeeded in cloning the Xa21 gene in
1995. And that same year, her teams of scientists and UC Davis filed for
a patent on it.19
UC Davis did not have the capacity to do the transformation
of rice with the Xa21 gene itself, so it looked to other laboratories.
One of the few laboratories with the capacity was the International Laboratory
for Tropical Agriculture Biotechnology (ILTAB), which was, at the time,
located in nearby La Jolla, California. ILTAB genetically engineered the
plants by shooting the Xa21 gene with a tiny gun into the cells of the
designated rice variety. The rice varieties that ILTAB is genetically
engineering with the Xa21 gene include BG90-2 from West Africa, two IRRI
HYVs – IR64 and IR72 – and two hybrid rice parental lines from
China – an indica restorer line, Minghui 63, and a japonica maintainer
line, 37 Wan A.20 Field trials of BB rice
have already taken place in China, with financial support from the Rockefeller
Foundation. 21
Researchers believe that the protein produced by the
Xa21 gene is able to detect diseases, such as bacterial blight. Once it
detects the disease it sends an alert signal, causing the cell to activate
its defense mechanisms against the disease. Xa21 is a particularly effective
resistance gene. Initial studies of the UC Davis and ILTAB BB rice showed
that it was resistant to 29 of 31 strains of Xoo for which it was
tested.22
With a patent in hand and successful results from field
tests of BB rice, Dr Ronald sent BB rice out far and wide. Researchers
in Europe, the US, Asia, and Africa are working to introduce the Xa21
gene into locally used HYVs.
Furthermore, research and development for the gene is
not limited to rice; plans are under way to utilize the gene in all crops
affected by blight.23
| Constructing BB rice
There are several steps in the genetic engineering
of a rice variety with the Xa21 gene.
First, the gene is cloned. The Xa21 gene is
actually a short segment of DNA within the rice genome. Within
this segment of DNA, there is a protein, which is what the cells
of Oryza longistaminata reproduce to combat bacterial
blight. Researchers refer to this protein as the trait for resistance
to bacterial blight. Identifying the precise location of Xa21
is difficult. Dr. Ronald likens it to "trying to find a
friend’s house in New York City or Tokyo without an address
or description."24 By 1990, researchers had, however, produced
a basic map of the rice genome with the assistance of genetic
markers. Using this map and the same genomics system used in
the human genome project, researchers at UC Davis were able
to identify the location of the Xa21 gene. Ronald admits that
much of the discovery had to do with "sheer luck",
as the gene turned out to be located very near to the first
chromosomal marker that she happened to look at, making the
cloning process relatively easy.25
Once the gene is cloned, it is transferred
to bacterial cells and multiplied. The gene is then cut from
the bacterial cells and spliced into rice cells through several
possible methods. The most common method used with Xa21 is a
biollistic method operated by ILTAB. Under this approach, microscopic
gold pellets are coated with the DNA and shot with a gun into
rice cells. Since the scientist has no idea where the gene ends
up in the cell, or if it is incorporated into the cell’s
genome, the gene is usually inserted along with another gene
construct incorporating resistance to an antibiotic. Thus, when
the transformation is complete, researchers can test to see
which cells have incorporated the DNA by exposing them to the
antibiotic. Those cells that survive the exposure have taken
up the DNA, although not necessarily the trait for resistance
to bacterial blight. Using tissue culture methods, scientists
then transform these cells into plants. Most of these plants
will actually not have resistance to bacterial blight. For instance,
of the 1,500 transgenic plants that UC Davis first developed,
only 50 were highly resistant to bacterial blight. Nevertheless,
with these 50 plants, the researchers could save the seeds and,
through several years of breeding, were able to produce stable
lines of transgenic plants incorporating the Xa21 gene.26
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3. IRRI TAKES UP THE WORK
In 1991, CAB International and IRRI released a publication,
entitled Rice Biotechnology, as part of a series of books on biotechnology
in agriculture. In that publication, Robert Herdt, Director of Agricultural
Sciences with the Rockefeller Foundation, outlined research priorities
for rice biotechnology. Herdt’s study remains IRRI’s only published
assessment of research priorities for biotechnology. According to Herdt,
bacterial blight affects 8.1% of the rice growing area in Southeast Asia
causing $57.5 million in crop losses – and nearly $100 million in
South Asia. Yet, for Herdt, conventional approaches to the disease were
already "effective and sustainable" and "biotechnology
approaches seem likely to be ineffective." In his ranked ordering
of research problems with potential for biotechnology applications, bacterial
blight is near to the bottom.27 So why is
IRRI pursuing BB rice?
BB as "benign biotech"?
IRRI – as well as PhilRice – could have chosen
other types of transgenic rice for its first field test application. For
instance, three modern varieties of rice have been genetically engineered
with a Bt toxin gene and IRRI has already field-tested varieties of transgenic
Bt rice in two locations in China. IRRI has experimented with Bt rice
since 1993, when it first imported transgenic seeds to the Philippines.
In fact, IRRI received approval from the National Biosafety Committee
of the Philippines to conduct tests of Bt rice within its greenhouse in
1996, nearly two years before approval was given for greenhouse tests
of BB rice.
IRRI has also conducted research on transgenic rice with
resistance to the tungro virus since at least 1992, when it received approval
for its "Transgenic Plants with Tungro Genes Project". In 1997,
Claude Fauquet of ILTAB told the press that ILTAB would collaborate with
IRRI on field tests for tungro-resistant rice the following year.28
Tungro resistance has also been on PhilRice’s agenda. In February
1999, PhilRice received permission to import tungro resistant transgenic
rice seeds from ILTAB and test the varieties at its screenhouse.
Research on transgenic rice with resistance to sheath
blight has also advanced and transgenic varieties have already been tested
at IRRI’s greenhouse.29 IRRI claims that the transgenic plants show increased
resistance to sheath blight and even projected in 1999 that field tests
would take place in 2000.30
All the above transgenic varieties involve a controversial
transfer of genes across species. Bt rice incorporates a gene from the
soil microbe, Bacillus thuringiensis. The tungro-resistant rice
incorporates a gene from the virus itself. On the other hand, although
many of the sheath blight resistant varieties incorporate a chitinase
gene from other plant species, IRRI has worked on a variety incorporating
a rice chitinase gene. The variety, however, only showed "some resistance",
and it still uses a foreign gene to cause over-expression of chitinase.31
All of these varieties have public relations liabilities, as field tests
could easily provoke public criticism over biosafety concerns.
Herdt’s study would indicate that there is no real
need for BB rice and IRRI's choice for its first field release
among its numerous transgenic rices would indicate that need is
indeed not the issue. In the joint proposal for the field test submitted
by IRRI and PhilRice, the applicants assert, "The field release of
[bacterial blight resistant] IR72 transgenic lines will be the first major
demonstration that genetic engineering is an invaluable tool in rice improvement
programs." Any first field test is, in many ways, the most important
field test. Therefore, BB rice should be seen as a trial run to test the
regulatory waters and the public’s reaction. If IRRI and PhilRice
can overcome public opposition to genetic engineering and carry the tests
out smoothly, it will set a solid precedent for future biotechnology research
and development in rice. In this respect, Rockefeller's low priority for
BB rice and IRRI's high priority for it match up perfectly. BB rice is
set to be IRRI's first transgenic rice released into the environment because
of the public relations factor.
BB rice might allow IRRI to avoid some of the biosafety
controversies that have flared up over other transgenic crops – both
here in Asia and elsewhere. For one, the isolated gene comes from another
variety of rice and not from another species. In fact, the Xa21 gene has
already been incorporated in IRRI’s HYVs through conventional breeding
and IRRI believes that its current use on farms will calm public fears.
Second, the Xa21 gene can be activated in the transgenic
rice without the use of a foreign promoter. All genes are attached to
promoters, which regulate the function of the gene. A promoter essentially
tells the gene when to replicate or, in other words, produce protein.
In most genetic engineering experiments, the natural promoter is cut from
the gene and an aggressive promoter from a virus or bacteria is fused
onto it. With BB rice, on the other hand, the segment of DNA comprising
the Xa21 gene contains both the trait for bacterial blight resistance
and its naturally occurring promoter. This promoter is capable of functioning
within the transgenic variety and there is no need for a viral promoter.
The most significant biosafety concern that can
be pointed to in the BB rice field test is that the resistant varieties
that both IRRI and PhilRice are planning to sow will carry controversial
selectable marker genes. Selectable marker genes are engineered into transgenic
plants so that scientists can determine which of the genetically engineered
cells and plants they have engineered carry the desired trait. For instance,
some plants incorporate selectable marker genes with traits for tolerance
to herbicides. After the plants have been genetically engineered, the
scientist can spray the plants with the herbicide and only those plants
that have been successfully genetically engineered will survive. Other
markers include genes for antibiotic resistance, and the selection process
works much the same way.
The concerns related to the markers are exposed in the
accompanying box.
| Concerns over antibiotic resistance genes
The transgenic rice that IRRI and PhilRice
have applied to field test incorporates a gene for resistance
to the antibiotic hygromycin (hph [aphIV]). The hygromycin
gene is part of a genetic DNA construct (pHX4) inserted into
the transgenic rice. The construct also carries a promoter gene
from the cauliflower mosaic virus (CaMV35S).
Transgenic crops with antibiotic resistance
genes can encourage the development of antibiotic resistance
among pathogenic bacteria.32 There
are a number of ways that bacteria can develop resistance to
antibiotics. One method is through a "horizontal"
transfer of DNA across different species of bacteria. Pathogenic
bacteria have been especially successful in developing resistance
because they have acquired open systems for horizontal DNA transfer
and are even capable of receiving DNA horizontally from non-bacteria
sources. For example, it is possible for a horizontal transfer
of DNA to take place from plants to pathogenic bacteria. Such
an event is extremely rare unless the circumstances that favour
it are multiplied – which is what the widespread use of
BB rice will do.
There are two ways for an antibiotic resistance
gene to transfer from the plant to bacteria. One process takes
place in the human or animal digestive tract. When the genetically
engineered food is digested, the food breaks down and its DNA
is "freed" or becomes "naked". At this point,
the DNA usually becomes unstable, but it is possible for some
genes to remain intact. The exceedingly small size of the antibiotic-resistance
gene increases the likelihood of this occurring. In every stomach
there exists a multitude of bacteria in varying physiological
states and there is a strong possibility that some of them will
be capable of incorporating the "naked" DNA into their
own genetic make-up. Furthermore, the ecosystem of the digestive
tract favours horizontal gene transfer across bacteria of different
species and could cause a rapid development of antibiotic resistance
among harmful bacteria. A second process takes place in the
fields. When the crops, and particularly their roots, decompose,
horizontal gene transfer can occur with the bacteria in the
soil.33
In October 1998, the British scientific association,
the Royal Society, stated that it was no longer acceptable to
have antibiotic resistance marker genes in genetically engineered
crops. These concerns were later echoed by some experts on the
British government’s Advisory Committee on Novel Foods
and Processes. In a letter to American authorities, Dr. John
Heritage, a member of the committee, wrote, "While the
risk is small, the consequences of an untreatable, life-threatening
infection spreading within the population are enormous."34
In February 1999, the European Parliament called for a ban on
antibiotic resistance marker genes in modified crops.35
The call has since been reinforced by a vote in the EP's Environment
Committee on the March 21, 2000 to prohibit the use of antibiotic
resistance marker genes.36 Even
Gordon Conway, President of the Rockefeller Foundation, has
called on companies to abandon antibiotic resistant marker genes,
maintaining that "alternative selection markers are now
available and should be used."37
Concerns also exist about the promoter gene
(CaMV 35S) from the cauliflower mosaic virus. Studies have shown
that new viral strains can arise when a virus recombines with
a viral transgene. A 1993 report found that the cauliflower
mosaic virus is capable of recombining with cauliflower mosaic
virus transgenes genetically engineered in plants. The recombination
can alter the host range of the virus and change the symptoms
that it produces.38 A more recent
study at the John Innes Centre in the United Kingdom found a
"recombination hotspot" in the CaMV 35S promoter,
suggesting that it is prone to recombination.39
Some scientists now argue that elements of the CaMV 35S promoter
may recombine with "dormant, endogenous viruses" to
"create new infectious viruses in all species to which
the transgenic DNA is transferred." 40
|
A better way of breeding?
There is really little justification for genetically
engineering rice for bacterial blight resistance. So far, the only advantage
indicated by IRRI is that the genetic transformation of BB rice is more
efficient than conventional breeding. Supposedly, with biotechnology,
breeders can cut back on the time it normally takes to transfer characteristics
of a plant, particularly a wild plant, into HYVs. Additionally, IRRI argues
that genetic engineering is a more precise process, allowing breeders
to select only those characteristics that they desire for incorporation
into their elite lines. According to IRRI and PhilRice’s joint field
trial application, "In breeding for resistance through the conventional
approaches, some desirable traits are inevitably transferred as well to
the breeding line … Through genetic engineering, only a well-defined
specific gene is incorporated into the breeding line without further disturbing
its genetic background."
IRRI and PhilRice’s assertion is misleading. Genetic
engineering is far from an exact science and can produce any number of
unintended side-effects in transgenic plants. At several points during
the transformation process, changes may occur to the DNA that the scientists
had not planned for.41 In a 1999 paper on
transgenic rice, IRRI plant biotechnologst Dr. S.K. Datta wrote, "Only
a few plants from a transgene population will behave in the expected way
without insertional mutagenesis, copy number of effects, somaclonal variation,
and pleiotropic effects."42
When PhilRice conducted a screenhouse study of BB rice,
it found that "The untransformed IR72 significantly produced taller
plants and higher percentage of filled grains compared to the transgenic
lines.43" The transformed rice also
had a lower percentage of productive tillers and shorter average panicle
length. The researchers suggest that the changes can be attributed to
"somaclonal variation whereby DNA changes occurred while the plants
are in the stage of cell culture," but they could not be sure.44
Other changes, not tested for or less visible, may have escaped the researchers.
Despite the obvious problems identified in the PhilRice
study, in their joint application for field tests of BB rice, IRRI and
PhilRice claim that, "Based on greenhouse and screenhouse trials
conducted at the PhilRice, Maligaya, Muñoz, Nueva Ecija during 1998 and
at IRRI during 1999, there is no difference in morphology and agronomic
characteristics between transgenic IR72 and non-transgenic IR72."
Yet another magic bullet
The technology may be new, but the concept is not. BB
rice is a continuation of the reductionist "magic bullet" approach
to agriculture that IRRI has employed since it first introduced disease
problems into South and Southeast Asia in the 1960s.
In a 1996 position paper defending its biotech program,
IRRI summarized its approach to disease management:
Mankind’s progress in using science to combat
insect pests and diseases is a continuous race between plant breeders
and pests. We have numerous examples of how plant breeders developed
plants with resistance to insects and diseases to find, many years
later, that the pest or disease organism mutated to overcome resistance
genes. The important thing is for scientists to be always ahead of
these organisms.45
Staying on top of the game is no easy task. In 1990,
IRRI claimed that IRBB21, its rice line with the Xa21 gene incorporated
through conventional breeding, showed resistance to all known races of
Xoo in the Philippines.46 Soon after,
however, several races of Xoo that were able to overcome the Xa21
gene were identified. These races were found in Korea and, most alarmingly,
in the Philippines.
BB rice is not a solution to bacterial blight. Even UC
Davis’ Pam Ronald acknowledges the problem:
It is difficult to predict the durability of engineered
or naturally occurring resistance in the field. For example, because
lines carrying Xa21 have not yet been planted over large areas for
a long period, it is unknown if the multiple isolate resistance conferred
by the Xa21 gene will be durable in a particular location. Furthermore,
recent results indicate that the three Xoo isolates are capable
of overcoming the Xa21 resistance in the donor and engineered lines.47
Dr Ronald voiced these concerns in a 1997 article. Since
that time, another five strains of Xoo have been discovered that
can overcome the Xa21 resistance in BB rice, some of which are found in
the Philippines.48
IRRI is once again confronting the wrong question with
the wrong answer. Its approach to disease management relies almost entirely
on breeding. In advertising the benefits of BB rice, IRRI conveniently
forgets its role in spreading the disease. In one promotional piece for
IRRI rice in which the Xa21 gene was incorporated, Dr. Gurdev Khush and
other colleagues write, "In the pre-green revolution period, [bacterial
blight] caused widespread yield loss."49
When IRRI’s top scientists fail to understand the nature of the problem,
what kind of solutions can be expected?
| The other way: cultural management
According to the Farmer-Scientist Partnership
for Development (MASIPAG), an independent network of farmers,
NGOs and scientists in the Philippines, there are at least eight
ways that farmers can control bacterial blight in rice:
1. Avoid excessive use of fertilizers rich
in nitrogen.
2. Do not use residues from infected plants
as organic fertilizer.
3. Provide only adequate irrigation and sufficient
drainage.
4. Save the seeds from those plants with
resistance to plant for the next season.
5. Maintain diversity in the farm by planting
different crops at the same time or changing crops every season
to decrease the pest population.
6. Be cautious in transplanting seedlings
from the seedbed to the field, since tearing of the roots
is a significant cause of infection.
7. Plant different varieties of seed, and
those developed from multiline breeding, with different levels
and means of resistance as a precaution against large crop
loses.
8. Remove infected plants and other possible
hosts of the pathogen.
Based on MASIPAG's experience, bacterial blight
is not a large-scale problem in the Philippines, since farmers
can easily deal with it.50
|
IRRI and its national counterparts, such as PhilRice,
are working against these sustainable, farmer-led solutions. As IRRI and
PhilRice launch expensive biotech programs to outrun bacterial blight,
both institutions are happily giving the pathogen a head start with other
programs that will increase incidences of the disease. Bacterial blight
is a controllable disease that even IRRI’s conventional breeding
program has had a fair amount of success in handling. However, the new
hybrid varieties and IRRI’s super rice are highly susceptible to
the disease. It is not surprising, therefore, that for PhilRice, its hybrid
rice program and its biotechnology program are "closely intertwined."51
4. PIECES OF A LARGER PROCESS
The upcoming field test of BB rice in the Philippines
is part of a larger strategy to promote transgenic rice in the region.
As the process unfolds, the actors and the agenda appear in sharp relief,
offering a valuable insight into the mechanisms and means through which
corporate biotech is emerging in South and Southeast Asia.
Passing the biosafety hurdles: co-optation or consultation?
Biosafety refers to the new dangers presented by the
release of genetically modified organisms into the environment. Often,
biosafety regulations are enacted in response to public concern over possible
hazards from biotechnology as these hazards become known. For example,
the current biosafety policies at IRRI sprung from a scandal surrounding
its experimentation with several strains of the rice blast fungus. The
scandal also influenced the very development of biosafety guidelines in
the Philippines, which were written before those of any other country
in the region.
In the 1980s, IRRI imported foreign strains of the blast
pathogen, which were donated and developed by several institutions, including
DuPont, in order to hybridize and test the pathogens at IRRI’s research
labs in Los Banos. Given that the disease is not a major problem in the
tropical lowlands, IRRI’s research risked introducing highly potent
and exotic forms of the disease into a defenseless environment. When news
of IRRI’s activities broke, the public was outraged and IRRI was
forced to account for its actions. The Philippine Senate even launched
an investigation of IRRI for, among other points, abusing its diplomatic
privileges and importing foreign isolates without proper import permits.
It was soon after the blast scandal that the Philippines government established
its own National Committee on Biosafety and the subsequent biosafety guidelines.
In 1996, IRRI was back in the headlines when it tried
to import transgenic Bt rice seeds to the Philippines. A resolution was
brought to the Philippine Congress, which argued that, among a number
of concerns, "There was no prudent compliance … as regards the
need to hold public deliberations on biosafety issues as fairly denoted
in the Philippine Biosafety Guidelines."52
IRRI dismissed the allegation, claiming that it had held a "public
meeting" at the University of the Philippines Los Baños (UPLB) concerning
its facilities for testing transgenic plants. Unfortunately, whether such
a "public meeting" constitutes a "public consultation"
is not easily determined since the guidelines do not define "public
consultation".
At this point, there is reason to suspect that a broad-based
public consultation about the field tests of BB rice will not take place.
IRRI’s Deputy Director-General, Dr. William Padolina, insists that
IRRI will follow the government regulations to the letter, but already
some aspects of the guidelines have been breached. For instance, according
to the Philippine Biosafety Guidelines, the IBC must be composed of five
members and "at least two of the members shall not be affiliated
with the institution and shall represent the interest of the surrounding
community with respect to health and the protection of the environment."53
Yet the UPLB IBC is composed entirely of scientists from the campus and
the two members that IRRI identifies as its "community representatives"
are former IRRI scientists!
Dr. Padolina also insists that the public consultation
process begins once preliminary approval is given by the NCBP.54
At that point, IRRI will "inform" the governor of Laguna (the
province where IRRI is located) and the mayor of Los Baños, and IRRI’s
IBC will undertake public consultations with the "community".
Since the biosafety guidelines are silent about what constitutes a "public
consultation" or the relevant "community", the parameters
will be left to the discretion of the IBC itself. At this point, therefore,
there is no way of knowing if Dr. Padolina is actually referring to the
14 scientific institutions operating in and around UPLB comprising the
"Los Baños Scientific Community", as has been the case in the
past, when he speaks about the "Los Baños community". If the
composition of the IRRI IBC is any indication, there is little reason
to expect broad-based representation in public discussions. Such an outcome
would significantly impact the "discussions on the comparative ecological,
economic and social impacts of alternative approaches" (Section I.B.2.1.3)
that the IRRI IBC is responsible for holding.
Ultimately, the NCBP, as readily acknowledged by IRRI,
is responsible for determining whether or not IRRI has complied with the
biosafety guidelines. Fortunately for IRRI, the NCBP has so far proven
highly supportive of the proponents of biotechnology. In the only other
applications for field trials of transgenic crops, which were made by
Monsanto and DuPont for Bt corn, the committee overruled local government
resolutions objecting to the trials and ignored gaps in biosafety data
supplied by the proponents. The public consultations stipulated by the
guidelines, therefore, proved inconsequential. In this context, IRRI’s
insistence that it will comply with all NCBP demands does not resolve
concerns about safety and public participation.
The NARS: partners or proxies?
At present, the most significant factor guiding IRRI’s
biotechnology program is the availability of the technology. Neither IRRI
nor the national agricultural research systems (NARS) have had much success
in isolating and cloning their own genes, leaving the development of transgenes
to the private sector and the labs of the North. Research and development
at these institutions in the North rarely, if ever, addresses the concern
of non-profitable sectors, such as small rice farmers. Furthermore, their
research is most often patented and distribution requires royalty payments
or licensing fees that put the technology out of the reach of national
breeding programs in the South. IRRI’s biotech program is, therefore,
severely limited by its dependence on the institutions and companies of
the North, and it can only sit and wait for potential "technology
transfer" opportunities to arrive.
When such opportunities have come about, IRRI has jumped
all over them. No matter how far-fetched the benefits may be to small
farmers in the South, IRRI tends to incorporate these technologies in
its research and development programs with little consultation with the
NARS and minimal assessment of the impacts. For instance, when the Swiss
Federal Institute of Technology developed a provitamin A gene construct
for rice, it was IRRI’s management that prioritized IRRI’s involvement55
– before consultation with the NARS and without a thorough evaluation
of the social and economic impacts. IRRI has now applied for a permit
to import the gene construct for the vitamin A trait and will be carrying
out research to insert the gene into IRRI varieties.
Priorities for research seem to come together on an ad
hoc basis: sometimes it is called for by IRRI management, and at other
times it is the individual perceptions of IRRI’s scientists. According
to Dr. Datta, "We, as scientists, see what is important, and we initiate
collaboration."56 Most of the biotech
applications that IRRI is currently working on – including vitamin
A rice, resistance to tungro, resistance to yellow stem borer, resistance
to blast, and resistance to sheath blight – are a continuation of
the work that Dr Datta was doing when he was a scientist at the Swiss
Federal Institute of Technology.
The only really clear guidance seems to come from one
of IRRI’s most committed funders – the Rockefeller Foundation.
More than any other institution, the Rockefeller Foundation has set the
agenda for research and development of transgenic rice. The Foundation
has pumped in over $100 million dollars into research on biotechnology
for rice, with IRRI playing a key role. The Foundation sets its own priorities,
of course, and nearly all funds that it provides to IRRI are targeted
at specific biotechnology programs. In fact, much of the research carried
out on the Xa21 gene has been supported by the Foundation.
In this ill-structured decision-making process, research
priorities rarely address the needs of farmers. BB rice is a case in point.
IRRI’s decision to use BB rice as the first field test is primarily
an exercise in public relations: to establish a precedent in terms of
public acceptance of transgenic rice in general. According to Dr. Datta,
BB rice "will be well appreciated by the public because the Xa21
gene is already quite well known." He admits that although resistance
to bacterial blight is not a major concern as a trait, BB rice "is
the safest product one could demonstrate and a good starting point for
transgenic rice."57 PhilRice concurs,
explaining that BB rice is a "less controversial" transgenic
variety that "will not rattle a lot of people."58
IRRI is also trying to portray the field test of BB rice
in the Philippines as a shining example of co-operation with the NARS.
Even though both institutions claim that they are quite capable of carrying
out the field tests independently, they decided to make a joint application
to the NCBP. But beyond the application, there is little evidence of collaboration.
First, PhilRice and IRRI are conducting their field tests in different
locations; PhilRice will be conducting its field trials in Muñoz, Nueva
Ecija, and IRRI will be conducting its field trials at an experimental
station at the University of the Philippines Los Baños (UPLB). Second,
while IRRI will field test varieties transformed at its own facilities,
PhilRice will test varieties imported from an American institution, the
International Laboratory for Tropical Agriculture Biotechnology (ILTAB).
With so little practical collaboration, it would seem that the "joint"
field testing application is primarily a set-up for IRRI to avoid being
the lone target of public criticism.
Similar motivations may be at work in the decision to
locate the IRRI field trial at a UPLB experimental station instead of
the IRRI’s own 252-hectare farm, which it leases from the University.
IRRI argues that since its own grounds are fully in use, it does not have
enough land available to satisfy the area required under the biosafety
guidelines.59 UPLB has therefore agreed to
offer one of its experimental stations for the trial and, in so doing,
has become a third party in the application. As a result, UPLB –
wittingly or unwittingly, depending on who you talk to – now shares
responsibility for the trials and has become a co-proponent with IRRI.
| BB rice and the International Laboratory for
Tropical Agriculture Biotechnology (ILTAB)
One of the most disturbing aspects of the "joint"
field test is that PhilRice is not even carrying out the tests
as part of its own breeding program. PhilRice’s field test
of BB rice is part of ILTAB and UC Davis’ efforts to test
their BB rice seeds against different Xoo strains
across the globe.60 As with the
variety that IRRI will test, ILTAB’s variety is a transgenic
IR72 engineered with the Xa21 gene patented by UC Davis. However,
whereas IRRI incorporated the Xa21 gene into IR72 itself, the
seeds that PhilRice will test were transformed by ILTAB and
imported on 1 January 1999.
ILTAB, UC Davis and PhilRice have already conducted
initial tests of BB rice within PhilRice’s screenhouse
in Nueva Ecija. The tests assessed the response of the transgenic
rice to 10 different Philippine races of Xoo. According
to the report from the screenhouse test, "Experiments will
be incomplete, however, unless transgenic germplasm is tested
and widely deployed in the field and extensively monitored."
The report continues, "Products of genetic engineering
for pest and disease management and other important traits are
expected in the near future. As recipients of such products,
Filipinos must also become familiar with the technology."61
ILTAB has also collaborated with the Thai Department
of Agriculture’s Rice Research Institute. In 1994, Thai
scientists from the Institute took samples of Khao Dok Mali-105
(jasmine) rice to ILTAB’s laboratory in California to modify
it with the Xa21 gene. The collaboration was supported by the
Rockefeller Foundation. Thai scientists then returned to Thailand
with transgenic tissue cultures in 1997 and began to breed transgenic
BB jasmine rice. According to a report in Thailand's English-language
newspaper The Nation, the Department of Agriculture grew
the seeds on a small test plot and harvested 123 transgenic
seeds.62 Since then, the Department
of Agriculture says that it stopped research due to biosafety
hurdles and fears about infringing the UC Davis patent.63
ILTAB was established at the Scripps Institute
in California with financial support from several US federal
agencies, the Rockefeller Foundation, and the French public
research institute ORSTOM. Its stated mission is to transfer
biotechnology to developing countries. The founder and director
is Dr. Roger Beachy, who worked with Monsanto to develop its
glyphosate tolerant crops when he was formerly with Washington
University. Beachy and ILTAB have now relocated to the Donald
Danforth Plant Science Center, just outside of Monsanto’s
headquarters in St. Louis, Missouri. The Center was built with
over $80 million from Monsanto. According to Beachy, "We
want to have as much diversity of funding as we can. I want
to see the involvement of as many private companies as we can
attract."64
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A new life for IRRI in the life sciences?
Biotechnology has turned the original conception of the
relationship between IRRI and the NARS on its head. Under the initial
vision, IRRI’s objective was to build up the capacity of the NARS
until they became strong enough to go it alone. IRRI was then supposed
to disappear. When IRRI was incorporated in the Philippines in 1960, the
Memorandum of Agreement with Philippine government stipulated that the
Institute would function for a period not exceeding 50 years from its
date of incorporation, "unless earlier terminated in accordance with
the law." Yet, mechanisms to measure the independent strength of
the NARS were never formalized, and IRRI’s existence has rarely been
challenged. Biotechnology is perhaps extending the timeframe indefinitely.
In its current conception of its relationship with the
"advanced" NARS, IRRI sees its role in "technical support
and training in upstream strategic research areas."65
However, with biotechnology, "training" means little more than
facilitating the study of the occasional PhD student or working with the
Rockefeller Foundation on various "shuttle research program"
exchanges, which can also involve laboratories in the North such as Cornell
University or ILTAB. The exchanges are quite effective in encouraging
interest in transgenic crops and some basic involvement at the national
level in biotechnology research and development. The problem is that they
only accentuate dependence on foreign institutions. This is a general
problem with biotechnology. It is dominated by those with the capacity
and the patent protection. The NARS do not have that capacity. 66
This is where IRRI is supposed to offer its support.
According to the Institute, "IRRI is undertaking support research
by accepting a responsibility for problem solving in specific areas where
the Institute, in consultation with its national partner institutions,
has proven to have a comparative advantage."67
One of the areas identified is biotechnology.68
But IRRI, itself, can only exert minimal influence over developments in
biotechnology. The private sector clearly dominates the field and IRRI
can only play the role as a center for evaluating potential technologies,
or worse, a facility to transfer technology from the North into local
varieties. This is precisely the role that the transnational biotech corporations
hope IRRI will play. Bruce Bickner, the Chief Executive Officer of DeKalb
Seeds – an American subsidiary of Monsanto – argues that, in
the new transgenic seed market, local seed companies will function as
"regional product testers and merchandisers."69
With the private sector showing more and more interest in rice, even IRRI’s
Dr. Datta feels that such a trend is inevitable for IRRI to escape. He
says that, with respect to biotechnology, IRRI will become "an evaluator
of genetically engineered products for the NARS," and will be responsible
for identifying which products are worthwhile. Indeed, the transformation
has already begun, as IRRI has just received export permits to send transgenic
seeds to Indonesia and India.70
CONCLUSION
IRRI hopes that its first field test of transgenic rice
will convince the public of the benignity and benefits of biotechnology,
and it has selected a variety of transgenic rice that it believes will
not arouse hostility. But scratch a little at the surface, and the field
test and the transgenic variety become perfect examples of everything
that is wrong with the technology and IRRI’s biotech program in general.
BB rice is not a long-term solution to bacterial blight.
It is another finger in a leaky dam that IRRI has evidently no real desire
to fix. IRRI has not shown a genuine interest in sustainable solutions
to the disease – not when it first introduced HYVs in Asia and not
now as it begins its large-scale promotion of hybrid rice and "super
rice", both with severe susceptibility to the disease.
The field test also demonstrates the ways in which IRRI
turns inward to shelter itself from scrutiny and a broader vision. To
date, the process behind the field test lacks transparency and proper
mechanisms for public input. There has been no meaningful discussion of
the benefits to farmers or of how the technology could even reach them.
But, once again, farmers are not the reason for the field test. The issue
here is biotechnology and the field test is a means to push biotechnology
forward in the region.
IRRI has no mandate to push the biotech envelope in Asia
or anywhere else for that matter. While it may hide behind its national
counterparts and unrepresentative agencies such as the IRRI IBC, it remains
unaccountable to farmers in the South. The issue of accountability is
particularly problematic with biotechnology, as techniques like genetic
engineering carry far-reaching social and economic risks. There will be
an unavoidable increase in corporate control of rice, with deep implications
for the region. Small farmers have the least to gain from this technology
and, actually, the most to lose. And they are the ones most marginalized
from the decision-making process. This is an unacceptable situation. The
introduction of BB rice – IRRI’s first transgenic rice to be
openly grown in the region – represents a critical moment for the
public, and particularly the farmers, to reassert control over the direction
of agricultural research and development.
|
BB Rice: IRRI's First Transgenic Field Test
was researched by Devlin Kuyek for a group of
organisations and individuals cooperating in a joint project
on current trends in agricultural R&D which will affect
small farmers in Asia. The organisations participating in this
research project are Biothai (Thailand), GRAIN, KMP (Philippines),
MASIPAG (Philippines), PAN Indonesia, Philippine Greens and
UBINIG (Bangladesh). Also participating in their individual
capacities are Drs. Romeo Quijano (UP Manila, College of Medicine,
Philippines) and Oscar B. Zamora (UP Los Baños, College of Agriculture,
Philippines).
The many people who gave time and information
to the preparation of this paper are gratefully acknowledged.
Published jointly in May 2000.
This material, in full or in part, may be reproduced
freely.
Comments on the paper may be addressed to Devlin
Kuyek at intku@hotmail.com
|
Footnotes:
1.
Department of Science and Technology, "Philippines
Biosafety Guidelines", DOST, Manila, 1991, Section II.1.4, p. 14.
Available on the World Wide Wed under http://www.binas.unido.org/binas/regs.php3.
2. Ibid., Section II.3.10, p. 29.
3. T.B. Adhikari, "Effects of Rice Genotype and Environment
on Bacterial Blight Progression", Master’s Thesis, University
of the Philippines Los Banos, the Philippines, 1991, p.6.
4. Shih-Pan-Yu Hsieh, "Ecological Studies of Xanthomonas
oryzae, the causal organism of bacterial blight", Phd Thesis,
University of Hawaii, 1973.
5. T.M. Mew, C.M. Vera Cruz and E.S. Medalla, "Changes
in race frequency of Xanthomonas oryzae pv. oryzae in response
to rice cultivars planted in the Philippines", Plant Disease,
No. 76, pp. 1029-1032.
6. Overseas Technical Cooperation Agency, "Bacterial
Leaf Blight of Rice Plant in Southeast Asia", 1970, p.8.
7. Keiichi Tatsuke, "Foreword" in Overseas Technical
Cooperation Agency, "Bacterial Leaf Blight of Rice Plant in Southeast
Asia", 1970.
8. Countries referred to are Bangladesh, India, Indonesia,
Malaysia, Burma, Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines, Sri Lanka, and
Thailand. Source: IRRI, World Rice Statistics: 1993-1994, Manila,
1995.
9. IRRI, "One Step Ahead: Outpacing Bacterial Blight
of Rice", Manila, 1996, p. 1, and T.B. Adhikari, "Effects of
Rice Genotype and Environment on Bacterial Blight Progression", Master’s
Thesis, University of the Philippines Los Baños, 1991, p. 8.
10. Ibid., p. 2.
11. IRRI, "Rice Diseases in Northern and Eastern
India, Nepal and Bangladesh: A Report of an IRTP Monitoring Tour",
Manila, 1979, p. 2.
12. T.M. Mew, C.M. Vera Cruz and E.S. Medalla, op.
cit., pp. 1029-1032.
13. IRRI, "One Step Ahead", op. cit.,
p.3
14. Pamela C. Ronald, "The molecular basis of disease
resistance in rice", Plant Molecular Biology, No. 35, pp.
179-186.
15. IRRI, "One Step Ahead", op. cit.,
p. 1.
16. Rasabandith Sengpaseuth, "Inheritance of resistance
to bacterial leaf blight in some rice varieties", Master’s Thesis,
Central Luzon State University, 1998, p. 3.
17. Ibid., p. 26.
18. Kerry ten Kate and Amanda Collis, "Benefit-Sharing
Case Study: The Genetic Resources Fund of the University of California,
Davis", Submission to the Executive Secretary of the Convention on
Biological Diversity by the Royal Botancal Gardens, Kew, no date, available
on the World Wide Web as http://www.biodiv.org/chm/techno/casestudies_pdf/Ucdavis.pdf
19. Ibid.
20. S. Zang et al., "Field testing in China
of bacterial blight resistant transgenic elite indica and japonica plants,"
no date.
21. Kerry ten Kate and Amanda Collis, op. cit.
22. Pamela C. Ronald, "The molecular basis...",
op cit., pp. 179-186.
23. Pamela C. Ronald, "Making rice disease resistant",
Scientific American, 1997, pp. 101-105.
24. Ibid., p. 102.
25. Ibid.
26. Ibid., pp. 101-105.
27. Robert W. Herdt, "Research Priorities for Rice
Biotechnology," in Rice Biotechnology, G.S. Khush and G.H.
Toenniessen (eds.), Alden Press Ltd., London, 1991, pp. 19-54.
28. Martha Groves, "Plant Researchers Offer Bumper
Crop of Humanity", Los Angeles Times, 26 December 1997.
29. M. Cohen and S. Savary, "The importance of pests
and challenges to their management", in K.S. Fischer (ed.), Rice
Production Systems in the Asian Region: Volume 1 - Challenges for Rice
Research in Asia, December 1996. Accessed from the World Wide Web
at http://thecity.sfsu.edu/~sustain/chap4.html
on 15 March 2000.
30. IRRI, "CE2: Applying Biotechnology to Accelerate
Rice Breeding and Broaden the Rice Genepool", in Sustaining Food
Security Beyond 2000: Medium Term Plan 1998-2003, p. 90. Available
as on the World Wide Web at http://www.cgiar.org/irri/Mtp2001/CE2.pdf
31. I. Potrykus et al., "Transgenic indica
rice for the benefit of less developed countries: Toward fungal, insect,
and viral resistance and accumulation of B-carotene in the endosperm"
in Rice Genetics III: Proceedings of the Third International Rice Genetics
Symposium, IRRI, Manila, 16-20 October 1995.
32. Patrice Courvalin, "Plantes transgéniques et
antibiotiques", La Recherche, No. 309, Paris, mai 1998, accessed
from http://www.larecherche.fr/VIEW/309/03090361.html
on 23 November 1999.
33. Ibid.
34. "Scientists warn of GM crops links to meningitis",
Daily Mail, London, 26 April 1999.
35. Greenpeace International, "Chronology of the
approval and bans of Novartis Bt maize in Europe", accessed from
the World Wide Web at http://www.greenpeace.org/~geneng/reports
on 15 September 1999.
36. European Parliament, Revision
of Directive 90/220, Common Position, Second Reading, Vote in Environment
Committee, 21 March 2000.
37. Gordon Conway, "Crop Biotechnology: Benefits,
Risks, and Ownership", presented at the OECD Conference on the Scientific
and Health Aspects of Genetically Modified Foods, Edinburgh, 28 February-1
March 2000. Accessed from the World Wide Web at http://www.oecd.org/subject/biotech/conway.pdf
on 5 April 2000.
38. J. Schoelz and W. Wintermantel, "Expansion of
viral host range through complementation and recombination in transgenic
plants", The Plant Cell, No. 5, 1993, pp. 1669-79.
39. A. Kohli, "Molecular characterization of transforming
plasmid rearrangement in transgenic rice reveals recombination hotspot
in the CaMV promoter and confirms the predominance of microhomology mediated
recombination", The Plant Journal, Vol. 17, No. 6, pp. 591-601.
40. Mae-Wan Ho, Angela Ryan and Joe Cummins, "Cauliflower
Mosaic Viral Promoter: A recipe for disaster?", accessed from the
World Wide Web at http://www.i-sis.org/camvrecdis.htm
on 5 April 2000.
41. P.H. Dale and H. McPartland, "Field performance
of transgenic potato plants copared with controls regenerated from tuber
discs and shoot cuttings", Theoretical Applied Genetics, No.
84, 1992, pp. 585-592.
42. S.K. Datta, "Transgenic Cereals: Oryza sativa
(rice)", Molecular Improvement of Cereal Crops, pp. 149-187.
43. L.S. Gueco et al., "Bacterial blight
resistant and agronomically desirable transgenic IR72 lines containing
Xa21 gene identified", no date.
44. Ibid.
45. IRRI, "Position Paper on House Resolution 280",
21 February 1996, p. 10.
46. K. Ikeda, G.S. Khush and R.E. Tabien, "A new
resistance gene to bacterial blight derived from O. longistaminata",
Japanese Journal of Breeding, No. 40, (suppl. 1), pp. 280-281.
47. Pamela C. Ronald, "The molecular basis...",
pp. 179-186.
48. Personal communication, 17 March 2000.
49. Kenneth Fisher, Hei Leung, and Gurdev Khush, "Box
2, Molecular Breeding: Biotechnology at Work for Rice", in G.J. Presley,
"Agriculture Biotechnology and the Poor: Promethean Science",
accessed from the World Wide Web at www.cgiar.org/biotech/rep0100/contents.htm
on 3 March 2000.
50. Personal communication, 4 May 2000.
51. Personal communication with Dr. Gabriel Romero, 5
April 2000.
52. IRRI, "Position Paper on House Resolution 280",
Manila, 21 February 1996, p. 8.
53. Department of Science and Technology, op. cit.,
Section B.1.1, p. 11.
54. Personal communication with Dr. William Padolina,
24 April 2000.
55. Personal communication with Dr. S.K. Datta, 22 March
2000.
56. Personal communication, 22 March 2000.
57. Personal communication, 22 March 2000.
58. Personal communication, 5 April 2000.
59. "Trials of transgenic rice in the Philippines
proposed," AgBiotechNet, accessed from the World Wide Web
at http://agbio.cabweb.org/news/Research.htm#Trials
on 15 Oct 1999.
60. Personal communication with Dr. S.K. Datta on 22
March 2000 and with Dr. Gabriel Romero on 5 April 2000.
61. L.S. Gueco et al., op. cit.
62. P. Hongthong, "Ministry asked to stop GMO research,"
The Nation, Bangkok, 14 March 2000.
63. Ibid.
64. Vic Comello, "Roger Beachy: A Leader in Revitalizing
Plant Science," R&D Magazine, December 1999. Available
on the World Wide Web at http://www.rdmag.com/features/11soy.htm
65. IRRI, "Accelerating the impact of rice research:
IM1 strengthening partnerships with NARS", IRRI Project summary
and highlights 1998, Manila, 1998.
66. IRRI, Sustaining Food Security Beyond the Year
2000: A global partnership for rice research: Medium Term Plan 1998-2003,
Manila, 1998, p. 21.
67. Klaus Lampe, "Rice Research: Food for Four Billion
People", GeoJournal, Vol. 35, No. 3, 1995, p. 257.
68. IRRI, Sustaining Food Security..., op.
cit., p. 8.
69. R. Pistorius and J. van Wijk, The Exploitation
of Plant Genetic Information: Political Strategies in Crop Development,
Print Partners Ipskamp, 1999, p. 149.
70. Personal communication with Dr. S.K. Datta on 22
March 2000.
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